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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE METAPHYSICS OF PROPERTY: LOOKING BENEATH THE
SURFACE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW AFTER TAHOESIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL v. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING
AGENCY†

“Where an excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected. . . .
Where there is an excess of liberty, the effect is the same, tho’ from an
opposite cause.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
An opportunity to clarify the boundaries of regulatory takings law arose
when the Supreme Court of the United States considered the alleged takings of
property by the regional regulatory authority in the Lake Tahoe Basin in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.2 For many years since its origin, the
doctrine of regulatory takings has remained somewhat undefined. By the end
of 2001, takings law had evolved into a nuanced and often convoluted judicial
analysis as courts were challenged with determining the constitutionality of
legislative approaches to limiting land use that have become more intrusive
than ever before into the realm of private property ownership. Though such
regulatory approaches are common responses to rapid growth and development
that might have adverse impacts on a community, they deprive property
owners of liberty and property rights in a way that the Constitution seems to
expressly prohibit.
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides
that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”3 The seemingly straightforward nature of the Takings Clause
has given rise to jurisprudence over the past century that continues to generate
intense discussion and debate.
For more than 200 years, property has existed as a boundary protecting
individual rights from encroachment by local government and other citizens.
† This Comment was selected as the Best Student Work to be published in the Saint Louis
University Law Journal for 2002-2003.
1. James Madison, Property, THE NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in CLASSICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 185 (Richard A. Epstein ed., 2000).
2. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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Embodied within the structure of the Constitution itself, private property
maintains the essential character of the social compact—it defines the extent of
the state’s police powers and establishes the frontier of the political landscape
as a buffer between the majoritarian powers of democratic government and the
American notions of liberty and personal independence.4 But depending on
who is asked, there are often competing characterizations of what “property”
actually means. To many, private property is the bastion of liberty and the
foundation of the values we hold sacred. To others, however, the nature of
property is not so much concerned with individual significance as it is with the
underlying relation that binds us together in society.5
The absence of a cogent scientific test for when a taking of property has
occurred has led to inconsistent judicial decisions that do not provide an
accurate guide for the decisions of both citizens and state government, property
developers and land use planners, and property owners and advocates of
sustainable development.6 As a result, the Supreme Court accepted the
opportunity to define just exactly what property the Constitution protects from
being taken.7 The Court would attempt the daunting task of defining the extent
of property rights by trying, yet again, to differentiate between mere regulation
and Constitutional taking.8
At the outset of the development of modern takings jurisprudence, there
was some debate as to whether or not the Constitution was intended to require
compensation for regulatory takings—where no physical property is actually
4. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 15 (1985) (observing that the Lockean ideas of property from which our
founders were largely influenced require “an explicit and rigorous theory of forced exchanges
between the sovereign and the individual that can account both for the monopoly of force and for
the preservation of liberty and property”) (emphasis added).
5. Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean Soliloquy: A Role
for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1140 (1996) (noting
that property was not viewed solely as an individualized end in the framework of Madisonian
republicanism but as a means to achieve the public good). The author notes: “Thus the
Revolutionaries did not intend to provide men with property so that they might flee from public
responsibility into selfish privatism; property was rather the necessary basis for a committed
republican citizenry.” Id. (quoting DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 68 (1980)).
6. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,
771 (2000), aff’d 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (noting that “[c]ourts have had little success in devising
any set formula for determining when government regulation of private property amounts to a
regulatory taking”).
7. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948 (2001).
8. “The attempt to distinguish ‘regulation’ from ‘taking’ is the most haunting
jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law . . . one that may be the
lawyer’s equivalent of the physicist’s hunt for the quark.” Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan
Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2158, 2170
(2002).
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confiscated, but where some economically viable use is taken from a parcel of
real property or where less than the whole value of the property in question is
taken.9 It is now well-established, however, that the government can “take”
private property not only by the physical appropriation of a part or parcel of
land but also by imposing substantial regulations upon private property.10
Justice Holmes pronounced, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon in 1922,
that “[t]he general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”11
The murky question of when such government regulation of private property
becomes too much, however, still haunts modern takings law. Since the vague
regulatory takings principle was expressed, this Fifth Amendment protection of
private property has given rise to an unclear body of law.12 While the Takings
Clause is designed to bar government from forcing some individuals to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public
as a whole, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it “has been unable to
develop any ‘set formula’ for determining when ‘justice and fairness’ require
that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated for by the
9. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause
and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995) (contending that the evidence of
original intent and early case law interpretations clearly indicate that the Takings Clause was
intended to apply only to physical takings and not government regulations imposing limitations
on property, and also that the limited scope of the takings clause reflects the fact that the founders
believed that physical possession of property was particularly vulnerable to process failure). See
also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1055-60 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
Edward J. Sullivan & Nicholas Cropp, Making It Up—”Original Intent” and Federal Takings
Jurisprudence, 35 URB. LAW. 203 (2003); John F. Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and
the Original Meaning of the Takings Clause, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1099 (2000); William Michael
Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 710, 711 (1985); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE L.J. 36, 56-59 (1964-1965). But see Andrew S. Gold, Regulatory Takings and Original
Intent: The Direct, Physical Takings Thesis “Goes Too Far,” 49 AM. U. L. REV. 181 (1999)
(arguing contrary to most recent scholarship that the text and historical record of the Takings
Clause support a just compensation requirement for so-called “regulatory takings”).
10. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 37-39; see also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
11. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (emphasis added).
12. Robert Brauneis, “The Foundation of Our ‘Regulatory Takings’ Jurisprudence:” The
Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes’s Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE
L.J. 613, 679-80 (1996); Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2169-70 (noting the “cacophony of
opinions” in recent takings cases as “compris[ing] a cry for help by a badly divided Court”);
James M. Reynolds, Takings Jurisprudence and Complex Schemes of Land Use Regulation: What
the Supreme Court Could Learn from the States, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 457, 457 (2002) (observing
that federal regulatory takings jurisprudence has “evolved into a highly nuanced science that
defies easy categorization into bright-line rules or even readily ascertainable standards”)
(emphasis added). See also Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Tools of Law and the Rule of Law:
Teaching Regulatory Takings After Palazzolo, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 713 (2002) (describing the
difficulty of teaching this complex subject to first-year law students).
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government, rather than allow such injuries to remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.”13
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,14 the Supreme Court was faced with the threshold question of whether
or not a taking of private property had occurred because of government
regulations that limited the use of such property. This Comment will briefly
explore the nuances of the regulatory takings analysis that are rooted in the
enduring conflict between private property rights and the ability of government
to use the police power to regulate the use of real property to some degree in
order to protect the general welfare, which includes the protection of public
lands.15 This Comment will attempt to show that the answer to an analysis of
what kinds of government actions would actually constitute a taking
necessarily hinges not only on how one characterizes the property interest
allegedly taken by government regulation, but also on how we define the
property that is actually protected by the Constitution and consequently the
extent to which that property can be taken.16
In the context of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tahoe-Sierra, this
Comment illustrates the views of competing factions that fight over where the
boundary between regulation and the free use of property exists. Ideas about
the role property plays in our political economy serve as the foundation from
which this Comment, and the Supreme Court, examines the question of when
regulation crosses that line from accepted exercise of the police power to
13. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations omitted).
See also Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967).
14. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
15. Lake Tahoe is owned by the States of California and Nevada, which hold it in trust for
all residents, and it is also considered a navigable water of the United States. See NEV. REV.
STAT. § 321.595 (2001) (enacted in 1979); State of California v. Superior Court of Placer County,
625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981).
16. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1446 (observing that “[h]istorically,
property definitions have continuously adjusted to reflect new economic and social structures”).
“In determining whether government action affecting property is an unconstitutional deprivation
of ownership rights under the Just Compensation Clause, a court must interpret the word ‘taken.’”
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 n.17 (2002)
[hereinafter Tahoe-Sierra] (noting also that in the regulatory takings question, “the predicate of a
taking is not self-evident, . . . the analysis is more complex”).
Professor Richard Epstein has reduced the analysis of the eminent domain clause to four
essential questions that must be addressed, in sequence: Is there a taking of private property? Is
there any justification for taking that private property? Is the taking for public use? Is there any
compensation for the property so taken? See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 31. This Comment, like
the case upon which it remarks, focuses on that threshold inquiry that must first be answered and
the next question that logically follows from it: Is there a “taking” of some private “property?”
And if so, is there any legitimate justification for the taking?
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become an unconstitutional taking requiring compensation to aggrieved
property owners. The regulatory takings analysis will hopefully become more
clear and outcomes more predictable by internalizing the underlying
assumptions and conceptualizations of property that structure the inquiry at its
most fundamental level. In the end, this Comment does not attempt to
formulate some new definition of property; rather, it suggests that the recent
case law and academic literature reflecting the complexity of the property
rights/land use planning conflict indicate that there might be no consistent
characterization of property that can be applied in every situation. It is this
recognition that will ultimately provide an opportunity for landowners and
town planners—and invite judges and lawmakers—to more precisely define
the metes and bounds of the private property that is protected by the
Constitution.
This Comment will survey some of the approaches to conceptualizing the
Constitutional definition of property that is protected from government
interference, explore the role these models might play in influencing the
direction of the ostensibly indefinite takings analysis, and endeavor to sketch
an outline for a contemporary understanding of property that reflects
traditional notions of fairness and justice and appreciates the political function
that private property plays in maintaining the American republic. Part II of
this Comment will investigate the utility that the idea of property has
performed in American society, discuss the increasing power of government to
regulate the use of private property, and provide a brief background of the law
of takings before Tahoe-Sierra. Part III will discuss the factual circumstances
leading to the Tahoe-Sierra litigation, the dueling approaches to the takings
analysis advanced by the Court’s three opinions, and the immediate legal
consequences of the Supreme Court majority’s 6–3 decision. Part IV provides
an in-depth analysis of what the case represents in the evolution of takings
jurisprudence, and it also considers the likely application of the holding for
future property rights disputes. Finally, this Comment offers a brief conclusion
concerning the inevitable political consequences of the Tahoe-Sierra decision
and the possible effects it may have on the development of the doctrine of
regulatory takings.
II. LIFE, LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF PROPERTY
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it
means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so
many different things.”17

17. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
117 (1902), quoted in Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339, 1356 n.12 (Fed. Cir.
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Property plays an essential role in American society, however, nowhere in
the Constitution is the term “property” actually defined.18 The concept of
private property is inexorably built into our ideal of individual freedom, and it
holds a venerated position in the American dream.19 The opportunity to
acquire real property is an unassailable American right that is recognized by
scholars as one of the philosophical foundations of our political system.20 For
government is instituted, according to James Madison, no less for the
protection of property than for the protection of persons or individuals.21
Property rights hold a unique place in the American system, and the
political philosophy of John Locke and other Enlightenment-era thinkers
cultivated the belief that property was a “natural political right of individuals
that preserved political liberty and fostered limited government.”22 These
ideas about property, based in emerging free market concepts of the relation of
liberty and property, have been widely credited as influencing the beliefs of the

2002) (referencing Alice’s adventures to show the “creative use of language” in defining the
words “permanent” and “temporary” that had previously been applied in Federal Circuit
precedent extending the categorical taking analysis to “conclude that a permanent physical
occupation, and therefore a taking, had occurred, without really requiring that the taking be
permanent” in a temporal sense, but only permanent as an actual and direct physical occupation)
(citations omitted).
18. Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1189-90
(1999) (noting that “in defining ‘private property,’ the Supreme Court . . . does not receive
guidance from the text of the Constitution, a document that once mentions and nowhere defines
the term”). “The text of the Takings Clause is ambiguous because the original understanding of
the word ‘property’ is uncertain.” Gold, supra note 9, at 240. See also Thomas W. Merrill, The
Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 996, 998 (2000) (labeling the four
“incomplete and disconcertingly disconnected” visions of how courts should define property but
believing that “an integrated understanding is still possible”).
19. See, e.g., VIRGINIA DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. I (June 12, 1776) (listing as “inherent
rights . . . the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing
property”), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/virginia.htm (last modified Dec. 18, 2003). See
also JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM 91 (1994) (noting Gouverneur Morris’s concept of property in the market
economy as “the right to free use”).
20. See Frank Michelman, Takings: 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1626 (1988) (observing
that “property [to the founders of American constitutionalism] was their inspiration for the idea of
a private sphere of individual self-determination securely bounded off from politics by law”).
Epstein’s version of takings doctrine is also embedded in a normative theory of constitutionalism
that undertakes to treat both democracy and limited government as first principles. Id. See also
Seán Patrick Donlan, Virtue and Vigour: The Federalist and American Civic Republicanism, 21
DUBLIN U. L.J. 90, 99 (1999) (noting that to early Americans, “[p]roperty was valorised not for
its own sake . . . but for the sake of self-governance”).
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 54, at 278 (James Madison) (Gary Wills ed., 1982).
22. DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 169 (1992).
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founders who organized the innovative social contract that created our nation.23
Such influences can readily be seen in the proclamation of the self-evident
truths expressed in the Declaration of Independence—that all men are born
with certain unalienable rights such as “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness”24—and are also embodied within the structure of the Constitution
itself.25
Over the past few decades, individual property rights have been more
limited by government action.26 Largely in response to the growth of the large
regulatory state emerging in the 1970s, a political movement formed that
advocated for stronger protection of private property rights from government
interference by turning toward all three branches of government.27 On the
23. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 278
(Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1960) (1690) (articulating the relation of government
and private property in a civil society that comes out of the “state of nature”). Locke observed:
For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men
enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have
property, without which they must be suppos’d to lose that by entering into Society,
which was the end for which they entered into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to
own.
Id. (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the transformation of property and its meaning in
early America, see SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 21-32 (attempting to describe how the meaning of
property moved from the “level of political rhetoric, permeated political consciousness, and was
translated into social reality” and specific social policies). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE &
MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 70-72 (1991) (pointing to the influence of
the political philosophy of John Locke in giving content to the Takings Clause as understood by
the Eighteenth Century American statesmen).
24. Compare THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men . . . are endowed . . . with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”), with LOCKE, supra note 23, at 406.
Locke understood the protection of “Life, Liberty and Estate” as the state’s essential function.
Richard A. Epstein, History Lean: The Reconciliation of Private Property and Representative
Government, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 593 (1995) (citing LOCKE, supra note 23, at 367).
25. See U.S. CONST. amend V; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028
(1992). “[T]he notion . . . that title [to land] is somehow held subject to the ‘implied limitation’
that the State may subsequently eliminate all economically valuable use is inconsistent with the
historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our Constitutional
culture.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
26. Joseph L. Sax, Some Thoughts on the Decline of Private Property, 58 WASH. L. REV.
481 (1983). Sax noted:
I believe that we have moved in recent years from a situation . . . in which we generally
encourage developmental rights, though recognizing they must from time to time be
restrained . . . . As a result, we are in the midst of a major transformation in which
property rights are being fundamentally redefined to the disadvantage of property owners.
Id. at 481.
27. Among the numerous inverse condemnation lawsuits filed over the past quarter century,
people have often pressured the Executive Branch to act and strengthen property rights against
government action. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 3 C.F.R. 554-59 (1989), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A.
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other hand, the emergence of comprehensive land use planning as a means for
citizen groups and municipal, state, and regional levels of government to
control the harmful environmental effects of intense, sprawling urban and
suburban development has, to some extent, offset the movement for the
increased protection of property rights.28 Such planning has become an
integral tool in the process of progress, as it allows Americans to design
calculated growth strategies that attempt to avoid the strain placed upon land
and economic resources that too often accompany development and that has
contributed to the decline of overall environmental quality of the country.
It is generally accepted that “the widespread and secure ownership of
property is the sine qua non of prosperity.”29 However, the founders
§ 601 (1996) (President Ronald Reagan’s 1988 Executive Order for Property Rights Legislation
entitled “Government Actions and Interference With Constitutionally Protected Property Rights”)
(attempting to go beyond the Supreme Court’s takings rules pronounced in the famous 1987
takings cases by relaxing the threshold standard for finding a taking and stating that such a taking
occurs if a regulation only “substantially affects” the value of property); see also James M.
McElfish, Jr., The Takings Executive Order: Constitutional Jurisprudence or Political
Philosophy?, 18 ENVTL. L. REP. 10474 (1988) (calling the order a “fundamental[] restatement of
the Administration’s core political philosophy of minimizing the intrusiveness of federal
regulation upon private interests”). Ironically, it was Ronald Reagan himself who, as Governor
of California, signed California’s bill endorsing the creation of the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency and, after early silence on the issue, praised the compact that created the agency that was
the defendant in Tahoe-Sierra. See Dan Herber, Comment, Surviving the View Through the
Lochner Looking Glass: Tahoe-Sierra and the Case for Upholding Developmental Moratoria, 86
MINN. L. REV. 913, 914 n.10 (2002).
Also, people have increasingly turned to the legislative branches of state governments
for relief. For an analysis of a recent innovative legislative approach to the “perceived inability of
constitutional law to adequately protect property rights from environmental regulations that were
themselves a reaction to rapid changes in population, technology, and knowledge,” see George E.
Grimes, Jr., Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act: A Political Solution to the
Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 557 (1996) (summarizing the Texas Real
Property Rights Preservation Act of 1995 requiring compensation when a regulation reduces the
value of property by more than twenty-five percent). By requiring takings-impact assessments
and providing a statutory bright-line definition of regulatory takings at a twenty-five percent
reduction in the value of real property, the Act favors property owners and should increase
government regulators’ awareness of such property rights relative to other public interests. Id. at
612. See also Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution: The Rise of State Takings
Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187 (1997).
In addition, the Supreme Court has “reconceptualized the Takings Clause, deploying it
as a powerful new tool to neutralize a wide range of environmental and land-use regulation and to
uphold personal liberty—the right to own and use private property—that some Justices feel has
been severely devalued.” Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2169.
28. See ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL,
PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 107-66 (1999).
29. Jeffrey W. Porter, Will Property Rights Legislation Endanger Smart Growth Efforts?, 30
REAL ESTATE L.J. 275, 285 (2002) (quoting TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY
AND PROSPERITY THROUGH THE AGES, 172, 341 (1998)).
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recognized that the regulation of property could not be outside the sphere of
governmental power because it is in the nature of property rights that they
require government to recognize and defend them, for “property rights are . . .
defined, determined, and regulated by society.”30 “[L]aw is born of property,
not the reverse.”31 And as the law has attempted to balance the conflicting
ideas about the role of property in the development of the regulatory taking
analysis, the courts have produced a “dense thicket” of jurisprudence resulting
in confusion and frustration for land-use planning and property owners alike.32
A.

Property: “Not merely transparent, but dazzlingly, brilliantly so”33

While it may seem intuitive, “property” is a term of art that is difficult to
grasp and can be even more difficult to articulate.34 The conception of
property held by the specialist (the attorney or the economist, for example) is
quite different from that held by the ordinary citizen.35 Though there are many
theories of how property interests should be characterized, there is no clear
consensus on their definition. The elusive nature of how exactly to define the
property interest(s) at stake in the regulatory takings analysis is the
30. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 91 (noting also that when identified with freedom, the case
for the “inviolability of property” was a powerful one). Nedelsky contends that “[w]hatever their
intrinsic values, life and liberty were not the reasons men joined together in societies and formed
governments. It was only for the sake of property that men gave up the greater freedom of the
state of nature and submitted themselves to the constraints of society and government.” Id. at 68.
See also Thomas W. Merrill, Zero-Sum Madison, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1392 (1992) (reviewing
NEDELSKY, supra note 19.).
31. BETHELL, supra note 29. “Property and law are born and must die together. Before the
laws there was no property; take away the laws, all property ceases.” RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY
AND FREEDOM 104 (1999) (quoting philosopher Jeremy Bentham).
32. See W.R. Grace & Co. Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 141, 145 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2002) (noting the court’s entrance into “the dense thicket of court decisions that have
sought to establish the boundary between private property rights and permissible governmental
action limiting the value of those rights”).
33. MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 175 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1872) (describing the
exceptional clarity of Lake Tahoe’s water), quoted in Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 307 (2002).
34. See, e.g., L.T. Hobhouse, The Historical Evolution of Property, in Fact and in Idea 3
(1913), reprinted in CLASSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 369 (Richard A.
Epstein ed., 2000). The author noted: “The divergence between legal theory and economic fact,
between written law and popular custom, between implied rights and actual enjoyment, enables
one and the same institution to be painted . . . in very different colours.” Id. See also Hanoch
Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1519-20 (2003).
35. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY 69, 69 (J.
Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (proclaiming the “death of property” as
commonly understood). Grey noted that “specialists and theoreticians have no answer; or rather,
they have a multiplicity of widely differing answers, related only in that they bear some
association or analogy, more or less remote, to the common notion of property as ownership of
things.” Id. at 71. For a thorough analysis of the many different views of property, see BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977).
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fundamental problem with such an undertaking.36 An initial survey of the
views of the competing factions that fight about where that boundary line
between regulation and free use of property should be drawn will be helpful to
understanding the regulatory takings analysis.
The English jurist William Blackstone defined the traditional view of
property as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world.”37 Thus, property in its liberal
and traditional sense is the right to ownership of an external thing or material
object.38 Even checking the thesaurus on a word processor, the word property
produces only two synonyms: possession and land. But while the vestiges of
an archaic concept of property pervade modern thought, property is more than
just a thing that is owned; rather, it is the rights or relationships to particular
interests in that thing that can be alienated from the proprietor without losing
the right to other interests in the same tangible property.39 In a modern
economy, “[p]roperty [has become] identified less and less with the rural
domain and more and more with capital goods and consumers’ durables.”40 In
fact, the Twentieth Century saw the emergence of the metaphor of property as
a “bundle of sticks.”41 Each stick symbolizes a specific interest that might be
associated with a piece of real property, including in no particular order the
right to use, the right to enjoy, the right to exclude others, and the right to

36. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting the “elastic nature of property rights”).
37. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (1803), cited in
ROBERT MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND-USE CONTROL
AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 25 (1999).
38. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1232 (7th ed. 1999). In fact, Black’s defines “property
right” as “[a] right to specific property, whether tangible or intangible.” Id. at 1323 (emphasis
added).
39. See ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 26. “I think it fair to say,” Ackerman surmised, “that
one of the main points of the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering law students of
their primitive lay notions regarding ownership.” Id. See also Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913)
(recognizing the social or political function of property).
40. Jean Baechler, Liberty, Property, and Equality, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra note
35, at 276. Observing that “the connection between the new forms of property and freedom is
less evident” than in the view from which the founders conceived of the importance of property,
the author notes that “the relation between private property and liberty, so clear to the thinkers of
the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, should become obscure, and even inverted, . . . in the
mind of the public today.” Id. at 276, 277.
41. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 35, at 81 n.40 (“The ‘bundle-of-rights’ conception of property
appears in well-articulated form for the first time . . . in Wesley Hohfeld”). Interestingly, Grey
also observed that the legal realists who developed the bundle notion were, on the whole,
supporters of the regulatory and welfare state, and in the writing developing such a conception, a
“purpose to remove the sanctity that had traditionally attached to the rights of property can often
be discerned.” Id. at 81.
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dispose of or transfer title. The idea of the bundle necessarily implies that
these rights are held together—that there is a bundle and yet many sticks at the
same time.
Regulatory takings jurisprudence has challenged the Supreme Court with
the difficulty of determining whether the removal of one stick in the bundle is
a compensable taking and also the burden of deciding to what degree the
government can regulate those distinct property rights without offending the
Constitution.42 It is not easy for the Court to shape the legal limitations of the
regulatory takings lexicon because there are many possible meanings of what it
is to take property, and perhaps this quality of the word property dictates that it
defy a distinct description. Understanding the transforming nature of property
and its role in the constitutional structure is essential to understanding the
regulatory takings analysis and why the Court has been unable to define
exaclty what property rights the Constitution protects. How property comes to
be defined in the Twenty-first Century will shape the future of the regulatory
takings analysis.
B.

Giving and Taking

The structure of what we label property rights “is such that the owner can
claim they are respected by everybody in the society.”43 Property rights would
not exist were it not for the power and protection of government,44 for it is
underneath the power and protection of the federal government that property
rights emanate, as the “title of the whole land is in the whole society.”45 In
effect, government exists to establish rules that protect the claim of right to
42. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in
the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1695-96 (1988) (noting the tension in the
constitutional property practice, the failed attempts to breakdown property into categories, and the
possibility of a “post-liberal understanding of property”).
43. Ugo Mattei, Property Rights in Civil Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 157, 161 (Peter Newman ed., 2000).
44. PIPES, supra note 31, at 97. Private property in the legal sense came into existence with
the emergence of public authority, i.e. the state.
45. See, e.g., Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 595 (1823);
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (noting that the
Supreme Court has indicated that property rights “are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also
LOCKE, supra note 23, at § 139 (expounding a natural law theory for the existence of property
rights and explaining that men form governments for the sake of protecting those natural rights).
In his dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, Justice Brandeis argued that a
“restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking . . . [as] [t]he state merely prevents the owner from making a use which interferes with
paramount rights of the public.” Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (arguing that there should be no taking where the restriction in question merely
prohibits a noxious use and the property restricted still remains in the possession of its owner).
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ownership. It follows that there are limitations on the rights of property. Each
landowner is burdened somewhat by government restrictions on land use, but
everyone also benefits from the restrictions placed on others.
Even those landowners whose use of property is restricted might in fact
benefit from such regulations.46 In the same way that the Fifth Amendment
protects individuals from bearing public burdens, the opposite must be true—
fairness concerns should bar the government from allowing some people alone
to enjoy benefits that in “all fairness and justice” should be enjoyed by the
public as a whole.47 As opposed to the traditional view that government action
“takes” some right from its citizens, the “givings” analysis observes that
government not only gives protection to claims of property ownership but also
guarantees economic value. There must be a balance between property rights
and the government regulation of its use.
In lamenting the decline of property as a category of legal and political
thought, Thomas Grey observed that “[t]he transformation of a preindustrial
economy of private proprietors into an industrial economy . . . presupposes that
the entrepreneurs, financiers, and lawyers who carry the process through have
the imagination to liberate themselves from the imprisoning concept of
property as the simple ownership of a thing by an individual person.”48 A
meaningful conception of property might escape any rigid definition, and
maybe we are wrong to expect such an “imprisoning” thought. But Grey’s
intellectual skepticism seems to deny the role that property performs in society
by giving up on the capacity of language to capture and signify what it
represents.49 A conception that can reassign meaning to the term “property”
must unite the sum of rights across multiple dimensions, fusing the sticks in
the bundle into a spatial and temporal whole. At the same time, property must
also be adaptable to our changing needs. As property gives us power and
rights and government regulates property when liberty exceeds common
reason, perhaps the concept of property is not quite disintegrating so much as it
is transforming from some feudal or Hohfeldian existence into a robust
political value reflecting the nature of the market and the role of property as a
bulwark from the overreaching of the contrasting values of liberty and power.

46. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987).
47. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 578 (2001)
(arguing that government actions also can “give” value to property, usually more often than they
“take” property).
48. Grey, supra note 35, at 75 (noting the obsolete thing-ownership conception of property).
Grey argued that the “phenomenon of the ‘death of property’ breaks the connection between
simple thing-ownership and the legal entitlements that make up the framework of the capitalist
organization of the economy.” Id. at 77. He also observed that “simple thing-ownership . . . has
been justified in classical liberal theory, and . . . in popular consciousness, as having intrinsic
worth.” Id.
49. See EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 20-21.
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The Emergence of “Smart Growth”

The concept of city planning is not a new idea,50 but many novel ideas and
creative strategies to arranging urban development have emerged in response
to the environmental deterioration of America’s landscapes. Traditionally,
local governments have attempted to control the use of property within their
jurisdiction through the application of zoning laws.51 While strategies to
design and plan urban growth patterns have been based on efficiency grounds
or were reactions to demographic changes, land-use planning has been
implemented most recently to curb the effects of sprawling suburban regions
and to protect environmentally sensitive areas in an era of rapidly expanding
cities.52 In recent years, comprehensive planning schemes, sometimes called
smart growth initiatives, have been enacted in many states attempting to take a
more conservative and controlled approach to development and to combat the
devastating effects of what is labeled as suburban sprawl.53 As a result of this
50. See Hart, supra note 9, 1109-31; see also THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PLANNING 345-80 (3d ed. 2000) (noting the history of urban planning as a means to the creation
of organized cities); Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 650 (1958).
51. One local government describes the process perfectly:
In a society such as ours, there is a constant struggle to protect people from the acts of
someone else. In behavior issues, this is done by making some acts crimes. With the use
of land, the method used to implement that protection is through land use controls. . . . All
of these laws are designed to protect one party from the acts of another party. Yet, it is
important to remember that protection for one party normally takes away what another
party considers his “right”.
City of Brentwood, Mo., What is Zoning All About?, http://www.brentwoodmo.org/
index.asp?ID=11 (last visited Dec. 18, 2003).
52. Compare Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (recognizing
the legitimacy of modern local zoning laws), and S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1975), with OR. REV. STAT. § 197.015(14)-(16) (2001)
(defining Portland’s Metro council, the regional urban growth planning body), and MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 15.75 (West 2001) (authorizing and encouraging regional planning); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
473.859 (West Supp. 2004) (calling for comprehensive plans to “contain an intergovernmental
coordination element that describes how its planned land uses and urban services affect other
communities, . . . the region, and the state . . . .”).
53. Smart growth policies “control where the government chooses to spend its resources”
and “repeal an ‘insidious form of entitlement—the idea that state government has an open-ended
obligation, regardless of where you choose to build a house or open a business, to be there to
build’” infrastructure. Bruce Katz, Smart Growth: The Future of the American Metropolis?, July
2002 (London School of Economics), available at http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/urban/
publications/20021104katzlse2.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2003). See Patricia E. Salkin, The
Smart Growth Agenda: A Snapshot of State Activity at the Turn of the Century, 21 ST. LOUIS. U.
PUB. L. REV. 271 (2002) (canvassing state smart growth statutes and their effectiveness). See also
Patrick Gallagher, The Environmental, Social, and Cultural Impacts of Sprawl, 15 NATURAL
RESOURCES & ENV’T 219, 219 (2000) (noting that what causes sprawl derives from the demands
of the citizenry that together generate “extensive and often uncontrollable development”); James
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war on suburban sprawl, the term “smart growth” has acquired a negative
connotation as critics of those who support more controlled development and
slower urban expansion have associated the movement with hindering
economic growth and progress.54
“Smart growth” has no exact definition, but it definitely cannot be
characterized, like its opponents believe, as anti-growth; rather, it focuses on
how growth occurs.55 Advocates of smart growth recognize the strain that is
placed upon urban infrastructure, such as roads and sewer systems, when
metropolitan areas expand at a pace beyond the capacity of the existing
infrastructure to accommodate the needs of a growing population. The idea is
that such tendencies should be offset by policies that do not thwart new growth
but rather promote responsible, measured development that conserves the
limited resources of state and municipal governments.56 As one observer has
noted:
Smart growth involves a choice between areas in a locality that should be
developed more intensely than applicable zoning allows and areas that should
be developed far less intensely (if at all) than zoning allows. The smart growth
concept is a disavowal of the traditional zoning process in favor of a zoning
process that requires very close hands-on planning . . . [and] much more
flexible planned development.57

Regional approaches, as opposed to action on a purely local scale, have
been the most recent trends in government efforts to resolve the various
problems faced by modern cities, including the lack of affordable housing, the
E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting
Nature, Markets and the Quality of Life Under the Takings and Other Provisions, 9 DICK. J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 421 (2001) (dissecting approaches to and implications of smart growth).
54. Epstein has noted: “Zoning stands in stark contrast to a system of private property, which
allows a single owner . . . to decide how to use his plot of land. Where property rights are
enforced, owners can make choices on efficient land use without having to overcome the
conundrums of collective choice.” EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 265.
55. Brian W. Ohm, Reforming Land Planning Legislation at the Dawn of the 21st Century:
The Emerging Influence of Smart Growth and Livable Communities, 32 URB. LAW. 181, 189
(2000) (recognizing smart growth as a reaction to the pattern of development in the United States
since World War II and also as an evolving approach to development that balances economic
expansion with environmental protection to produce a better quality of life overall).
56. Such a goal is absolutely necessary as the country attempts to avoid an even deeper
recession in the wake of the September 11th tragedy and its effects on the economy. Many states,
and in turn their cities, face severe budget crises as their limited resources are overextended. It is
imperative that a more thoughtful approach to development that considers all of the region-wide
consequences of expansion become a priority. See Douglas R. Porter, State Growth
Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment, 13 PACE L. REV. 481 (1993).
57. John M. Armentano, Zoning and Land Use Planning, 30 REAL ESTATE L.J. 77, 78
(2001). The development philosophy of “‘Smart Growth’ has become the touchstone for
virtually all of the parties involved in the development process, from civic groups to developers
and from environmentalists to government officials.” Id. at 77.
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decline of urban centers, transportation concerns, and the decreasing quality of
the environment.58 Planning strategies have emphasized a regional approach to
comprehensive land use designs to account for all of the consequences that
local land use regulations can cause among neighboring jurisdictions.59 There
has been a strong reaction, however, to sweeping land use controls that are
used as tools for managing growth and curbing the spread of suburban
cityscapes.60 Nonetheless, the regulation of land use by local governments
continues to be an essential tool in dealing with the social, environmental, and
economic consequences that are the direct result of decisions about how to use

58. See Holloway & Guy, supra note 53, at 421. See also Porter, supra note 29. For an
assessment of the problems faced by comprehensive planning as a guide to rational local
decision-making and the objectives of planning legislation to deal with the concern regarding the
“dynamic nature of community growth and change,” see Ohm, supra note 55, at 205. See also
Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002) (stressing the
need for regional government and proposing alternative approaches to deal with the problems of
implementing and maintaining the conventional “two-tier” model of government that cannot fully
address all of a region’s economic problems); Richard G. Lorenz, Good Fences Make Bad
Neighbors, 33 URB. LAW. 45, 45 (2001) (arguing that states should “modify existing local
government laws in order to facilitate principled inter-city negotiations for the purpose of
building more effective regional communities”).
59. See James H. Wickersham, Note, The Quiet Revolution Continues: The Emerging New
Model for State Growth Management Statutes, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 489 (1994). See also S.
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1975) (striking down
a system that in practice leads to exclusionary zoning, when, for example, one locality refuses to
build a fair share of affordable housing and, in effect, forces the burden of meeting the market
demand upon neighboring municipalities). The current emphasis on regional concepts of
planning and “comprehensive land use plans” results from the understanding that “[i]n reality,
zoning at the local level has a decided impact upon the development of the region.” DAVID H.
MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 11 (1977) (noting that “[t]he standard zoning
enabling legislation grants to municipalities the power to zone”). The author observes that from
the regional point of view it makes a big difference where “industries are located, where major
transportation facilities are built, and where housing is provided.” Id. at 12.
60. This reaction to smart growth initiatives has been seen in the state legislatures and in the
voting booths. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REV.
158 (2001) (noting the failure of initiatives that proposed statewide growth management plans in
Arizona and Colorado on election day 2000 and the ratification of a partial-takings measure in
Oregon requiring compensation for all regulations that simply reduce the economic value of a
parcel of land). The proposed amendment to the Oregon Constitution stated:
[I]f the government passes or enforces a regulation that restricts the use of private real
property, and the restriction has the effect of reducing the value of property upon which
the restriction is imposed, the property owner shall be paid just compensation equal to the
reduction in the fair market value of the property.
Compare id. at 169-70 (quoting OR. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) (2000)) (emphasis added), with
Gallagher, supra note 53, at 219 (noting “voters passed 70 percent of a record 240 ballot
initiatives relating to sprawl control” as recently as 1998). See also Grimes, supra note 27
(outlining a legislative response to the uncertainty of the regulatory takings analysis).
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land.61 The extent to which such regulations might limit the use of private land
raises questions about their validity; however, “economic development [might]
ultimately depend[] on institutions that can protect and maintain the
environment’s carrying capacity and resilience.”62
2.

“Entitlement Chopping”63

In order to determine whether a regulatory taking has occurred, a court
must determine the relevant property that is affected. As opposed to viewing a
parcel of land in its entirety, entitlement chopping, or conceptual severance, is
the theory that property interests in the bundle of existing property rights can
be pulled apart when not all of the interests held by a landowner are affected
by a regulation.64 This model of understanding requires that each regulated
interest, no matter how small, must be compensated for by the regulator.65
Property interests usually have many different dimensions: a physical
dimension describing the size and shape of the property, a functional
dimension describing the extent to which an owner may use or dispose of the
property, and a temporal dimension that describes the duration of the property
interest.66 This doctrine therefore consists of separating, from the owner’s
61. See Amanda Siek, Comment, Smart Cities: A Detailed Look at Land Use Planning
Techniques that are Aimed at Promoting Both Energy and Environmental Conservation, 7 ALB.
L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 45 (2002). See also FREILICH, supra note 28, at 209-52 (providing
numerous examples of state statutes and policies aimed at curbing sprawl, and noting the “‘quiet
revolution’ in land use controls”). Freilich notes the federal government’s long history of
encouraging sprawl through housing policies and the development of the interstate highway
system, but he also acknowledges movement in the direction of policies that allow the federal
government to “provide guidance and strong incentives to the states” to solve these problems. Id.
at 303-12. Freilich also points out that “[s]till, the United States is the only major Western nation
that has failed to adopt an explicit national urban growth policy.” Id. at 303.
62. Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe, An Introduction to Property Rights and the
Environment, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES
3 (Susan Hanna & Mohan Munasinghe eds., 1995) (citation omitted).
63. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1601 (referring to entitlement chopping as another name
for conceptual severance).
64. See Herber, supra note 27, at 935-41 (making the case that Penn. Coal neither created
any conceptual severance doctrine nor even argued the fact that if one stick in the bundle of
property rights is extinguished, it alone is sufficient to effect a taking by noting that much of
Holmes’s opinion was dictum considering the limited question before the Court in that case, and
arguing that the case is important only because it affirmed the separation of the treatment of the
eminent domain duty from the police power).
65. See Michelman, supra note 20, at 1614.
66. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 330 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting regulations are three-dimensional); Robert H.
Freilich, Time, Space, and Value in Inverse Condemnation: A Unified Theory for Partial Takings
Analysis, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 589, 593 (2002). In Tahoe-Sierra, petitioners argued a novel
theory of “temporal severance,” believing that a fee interest in land could be divided into distinct
segments, measured by time, that can be accorded a value and compensated. Their argument
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aggregate of rights in the property, a property interest that is comprised solely
of just that right or interest the government action has regulated. Then the
aggrieved landowner may assert that a particular “whole” thing has been
The conceptual severance theory has caused
permanently taken.67
considerable problems in the regulatory takings context as it encourages
property owners to focus on one stick in the bundle of property rights and to
disregard the incidents of property ownership in society by seeking monetary
relief from the government whenever any property right is affected.68
The problem with the notion of conceptual severance lies in the reality that
“any land-use regulation can be characterized as the ‘total’ deprivation of an
aptly defined entitlement.”69 Because of this possibility, modern Supreme
Court jurisprudence has produced mixed results, reflecting a hesitation to adopt
a notion of property that allows a single parcel to be divided into discrete
functional or temporal segments to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated.70 It is true that “[l]and-use regulations
are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential
way . . . [thus treating] them all as per se takings would transform government
regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”71 Therefore, the
challenge for the future of regulatory takings jurisprudence must be to
prioritize the protected sticks of property rights and the extent to which each is
essentially limited.

ultimately failed. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 327 (2002). See also Herber, supra note 27, at
924-25 n.75 (noting that conceptual severance goes by other names, including the “denominator
problem”).
67. Carla Boyd, Comment, Temporal Severance and the Exclusion of Time in Determining
the Economic Value of Regulated Property, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 793, 803 (2002).
68. This activity promotes the idea that people are somehow owed something by the
government, or that one’s rights are more important than the rights of others. The faithful
listeners of conservative champion Rush Limbaugh will understand that those who think this way
are a part of the ever-expanding class of what he labels the “entitlement culture,” a dangerous
faction of our society that believes the American public owes them something for every alleged
“harm” they suffer.
69. Michelman, supra note 20, at 1614.
70. See Boyd, supra note 67, 803-04 (noting that “[d]efining the property in a regulatory
takings analysis is a[] . . . contentious undertaking” and that the Tahoe-Sierra case will provide
the Court the opportunity to clarify what the “relevant parcel” is for the purpose of the takings
inquiry). Compare Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (rejecting conceptual severance),
with First English, 482 U.S. 304 (requiring just compensation for a taking that was unchallenged
before the Supreme Court, but was arguably based on a notion of temporal severance). See also
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001).
71. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002). Accord Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 39,
413 (1922) (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could
not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”).
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C. A Brief History of Takings
As such, modern litigation involving the Takings Clause has produced a
labyrinth of decisions often based on imprecise standards and vague
interpretations. Many people are undoubtedly apprehensive upon entering this
area of law. This Comment has emphasized the important function that
property plays in balancing that boundary between the rights of property
owners and other individuals as well as between the government and the
governed. While the development of regulatory takings jurisprudence has been
well documented, a brief outline of some of the major cases in the
development of this puzzle might be helpful in understanding its complex
nature.72
1.

The First Two Hundred Years

The framers were familiar with legislative land use regulations, for many
land use controls were passed after our country’s independence and before the
adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1791.73 The Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence has been based on the understanding that the takings clause
prohibits “[g]overnment from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole.”74
Takings jurisprudence has distinguished in kind its analysis of physical and
regulatory takings. “[S]o long as these regulations do not require the
[landowner] to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his [property] by
a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally

72. See Haar & Wolf, supra note 8, at 2162 n.13 (citing numerous examples among the
plethoric commentary about regulatory takings jurisprudence and categorizing five classes of the
literature as the “classics” (exploring the tension between public need and private right), the
“expansionists” (advocating the preclusion of a wide range of regulation), the “reactions” (to the
most recent Supreme Court case), the “outside-the-boxes” (attempting to reconceptualize the
entire notion), and the “muddlers” (exasperating the hopelessly confused state of takings law)).
For a review of the development of the law of regulatory takings and the relevance of the TahoeSierra decision, see Jordan C. Kahn, Lake Tahoe Clarity Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court
Advances Land Use Planning in Tahoe-Sierra, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J., FALL 2002, at
33; Danaya C. Wright & Nissa Laughner, Shaken, Not Stirred: Has Tahoe-Sierra Settled or
Muddied the Regulatory Takings Waters?, 32 ENVTL. LAW. REP. 11177 (2002); David L. Callies
& Calvert G. Chipchase, Moratoria and Musings on Regulatory Takings: Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 25 U. HAW. L. REV. 279 (2003).
73. See Herber, supra note 27, at 921 (observing that the notion of regulatory takings did not
exist from 1791 to 1922). Also, scholars have noted that “[i]f someone as articulate as Madison
had wanted to restrict the regulation of land use . . . he would have done so unmistakably.” Id. at
944-45 (citations omitted) (alteration in original). See also John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law
and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996).
74. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)).
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applicable to nonpossessory government activity.”75 The rationale for this
doctrine is justified by the widely held belief that though the total deprivation
of beneficial use is, from the landowner’s perspective, the equivalent of a
physical appropriation,76 they are two separate kinds of takings, subject to a
different approach―an idea that is fleshed out in Tahoe-Sierra.77 In one case,
the government uses its eminent domain authority to physically take property,
while in the regulatory context, an allegedly injured property owner must
assert his rights by instituting an inverse condemnation proceeding.78 It is now
well-established jurisprudence that government land use regulations might so
severely overstep the bounds of the police power so as to effect a taking
requiring compensation to the aggrieved landowner.79
The origin of the modern prohibition against certain regulations has been
traced to the regulatory zoning approaches of the expanding urban areas of the
World War I era and to Justice Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal v.
Mahon.80 Justice Holmes stated that “if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.81 In 1978, the Supreme Court attempted to modernize
the enigmatic statements inherited from Justice Holmes by fleshing out the law
of regulatory takings into a list of factors to be considered in the takings
75. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982). See also
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322 (“jurisprudence involving . . . physical takings is as old as the
Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward application of per se rules.”).
76. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
77. 535 U.S. at 321-25 (2002). The Court observed that the Fifth Amendment itself provides
a basis for drawing this distinction, distinguishing the plain language that requires the payment of
compensation whenever the government acquires private property from the fact that the
Constitution itself makes no reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making
certain uses of her private property. Id.
78. “The phrase ‘inverse condemnation’ generally describes a cause of action against a
government defendant in which a landowner may recover just compensation for a ‘taking’ of
property under the Fifth Amendment, even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise
of the sovereign’s power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the government entity.”
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980)).
79. Justice Scalia has observed, “We have never set forth the justification for this [regulatory
takings] rule. Perhaps it is simply . . . that total deprivation of beneficial use is, from the
landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropriation.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017
(citations omitted). Perhaps the justification can be seen when there is differential treatment
among property owners, such that “the police power has become a cloak for illegitimate ends
whose influence overwhelms the stated reasons” for regulation. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 133.
80. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
81. Id. at 415. In Penn. Coal, the Court acknowledged that a governmental body may take
property by appropriating land and taking physical possession of it under the power of eminent
domain, and it might also violate the Takings Clause by regulating property so much under the
police power so as to effectively render it worthless to the owner. See Herber, supra note 27, at
935-41.
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analysis to determine more precisely when a regulation has gone too far. The
Court laid out three aspects of a fact-specific analysis that have particular
significance when inquiring into the question of whether or not a compensable
taking has occurred because of a government regulation: (1) the character of
the government action; (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
distinct, investment-backed expectations, and (3) the economic impact of the
regulation.82 After it outlined the factors to be considered in the regulatory
takings analysis, the Supreme Court declared that a complete examination of
whether a government regulation is a taking also requires a two-part test.
Thus, the Fifth Amendment is violated when a regulation of land use “does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an owner
economically viable use of his land.”83
The Court’s 1987 Term epitomized the reinvigorated support of individual
property rights. The Court heard numerous takings cases in an attempt to more
clearly define the law of regulatory takings for aggrieved landowners.84
During that Term, the Court endeavored to define the denominator for
82. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
83. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, 261-62 (citations omitted) (holding that a zoning ordinance was
not a taking because, though it restricted the use of appellants’ five-acre tract of land with a view
of the San Francisco Bay to allow the development of only one house per acre, the land was not
deprived of all economically valid use, and noting the importance of the requirement that the
government justification for the action must substantially advance a legitimate state interest); see
also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). Agins held that
mere fluctuations in market value during governmental decision-making, absent bad faith, do not
constitute a taking. Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9.
84. The “1987 Takings Trilogy” includes: Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. 470; First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (holding that
temporary takings are not different in kind from permanent takings and where such a taking is
already found, compensation is required); and Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825,
841-42 (1987) (holding that a condition to building that required landowners to grant a public
access easement across their property does not serve a “rational relation” to any government
interest and constitutes a taking). See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Keystone Bituminous Coal, First
English and Nollan: A Framework for Accommodation?, 34 WASH U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L.
173 (1988). See also Michelman, supra note 20. One author noted that while the Court did give
more attention to landowner cases in the 1980s, property owners suffered “repeated defeats [that]
may only serve to emphasize the inferior status of landowner rights.” DENNIS J. COYLE,
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE
REGULATION 175 (1993) (providing a table showing that landowners won only thirty percent of
the time in Supreme Court decisions on constitutional rights of landowners).
Some have argued that First English established the use of the “temporal severance
doctrine” in determining if a taking exists. In the words of the First English Court, however, it
“merely [held] that where the government’s activities have already worked a taking of all use of
property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation.” First English, 482 U.S. at 321. See also Thomas E. Roberts, Moratoria as
Categorical Regulatory Takings: What First English and Lucas Say and Don’t Say, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 11037 (2001).
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purposes of the so-called “deprivation fraction.”85 The denominator problem
arises in takings cases where the property owner’s entire parcel is not
completely taken, though a distinct portion of his property rights, whether of
actual land or some economic value that might be severable, might have been
taken.86 Because the test for regulatory takings requires the courts to compare
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains in
the property, the critical question is to determine how to define the unit of
property “whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”87 This
critical question has led to a divide on the Court, and among scholars as well,
between those who advocate looking at the “parcel as a whole,” and those who
would view any deprivation of or limitation on any strand in the metaphorical
“bundle of sticks” as the property right against which the allegedly
unconstitutional regulation is to be measured.
2.

Drawing a Line in the Sand: The Challenge to Develop Unequivocal
Rules

The property rights movement reached its peak with a victory in the
landmark decision Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.88 Justice Scalia’s

85. See Michelman, supra note 13, at 1192. Professor Michelman observed that Penn.
Coal’s diminution in value test calls for a fractional comparison between the loss in value of the
property affected by the regulation (the numerator) and the preexisting value of the property (the
denominator) to determine the extent of the deprivation and a determination of whether the
regulation has gone “too far.” He noted that such an analysis raised the problematic question of
“how to define the ‘particular thing’ whose value is to furnish the denominator of the fraction.”
Id. For an analysis of the benefits fraction, see Benjamin Allee, Note, Drawing the Line in
Regulatory Takings Law: How a Benefits Fraction Supports the Fee Simple Approach to the
Denominator Problem, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1957, 2013-14 (2002) (observing that segmenting
an individual’s property funnels claims into the Lucas rule without considering the fairness
principle that is the basis for regulatory takings law). See also John E. Fee, Comment,
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994).
86. Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J.
663, 679 n.79 (1996). The Court first confronted this problem in Penn Central, though it did not
recognize any takings fraction. In that case, it measured the effect of a given regulation on a
whole parcel of land, not on individual strands of affected property rights. See Penn Central, 438
U.S. 104. The Penn Central Court measured the effect of the regulation against the entire
property interest of the property owner and refused to characterize New York’s Historic
Preservation Act as taking the rights of an interest in the air above Grand Central Station that
would have severed such right from the property parcel as a whole. Id. at 130. The Court also
limited the characterization of the denominator by refusing to take into account the whole
property owned by the landowner in the city, noncontiguous to the parcel at issue, when
considering against what property to measure the regulation and determine if there had been a
total taking. Id.
87. Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 497 (citing Michelman, supra note 13, at 1192).
88. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Lucas was significant in effecting “basic changes in . . . the
constitutional definition of private property itself.” See Michael J. Davis, Lucas and Takings:
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opinion for the Court articulated the “categorical taking” in the regulatory
context—a per se rule establishing that a taking occurs whenever a regulation
deprives the landowner of “all economically beneficial or productive use of
land.”89 A taking in the Lucas sense is categorical in that the courts will not
balance the importance of the public interest advanced by the regulation
against the regulation’s imposition on private property rights.90 Rather, it is
enough that the regulation has the effect of taking all of the economic use out
of the property.91 But determining when all of the potential economic use has
been taken from the regulated property has proven difficult to establish, and
the results of such an inquiry inevitably rest on the way the property interest is
quantified.92 Thus, whether or not an owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial or productive use of his property ultimately depends
upon how the property is defined.93
Though the denominator problem does not arise in a case where the
property owner’s entire parcel is deprived of all economically beneficial use
because (even using the largest possible denominator, the regulation’s effect
would be a 100% diminution in value) defining the property interest against
which regulations are to be measured was still a central concern. Justice
Scalia’s opinion in Lucas also made clear, though, that a regulation that
deprives property of all economically viable use could be upheld where the
economically viable use would have violated state nuisance law or background
priciples of state property law.94 The uncompromising categorical rule
Private Property Redefined, 2 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Spring 1993, at 83 (noting the “brave new
world of takings law” ushered in by the decision).
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. Residential developer owner David Lucas was prohibited from
developing any structures on two beachfront lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near
Charleston, South Carolina. The state’s Beachfront Management Act, which was enacted after
Lucas purchased his property, prohibited development on certain lands to protect tidelands,
beaches, and oceanfront sand dunes. See Jennifer Dick & Andrew Chandler, Shifting Sands: The
Implementation of Lucas on the Evolution of Takings Law and South Carolina’s Application of
the Lucas Rule, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 637, 651-52 (2002); see also Paul Turner & Sam
Kalen, Takings and Beyond: Implications for Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25, 30-32 (1998)
(noting that Courts are being asked more than ever before to “resolve the balance between
preserving effective regulatory control options and protecting private property”).
90. See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
“‘[C]ategorical’ [means] those ‘categories of regulatory action [that are] compensable without
case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint.” Good v.
United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (emphasis added) (alteration in original)
(quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015).
91. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7.
92. See id. at 1015.
93. Id. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that the “deprivation of all economically
valuable use” of property cannot be determined objectively).
94. Id. at 1029-30. These are the two exceptions to the categorical rule. See, e.g., Todd D.
Brody, Comment, Examining the Nuisance Exception to the Takings Clause: Is There Life for
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championed in Lucas is an exception to the general rule and reveals a turning
away from the multi-factor analysis toward developing a more unequivocal
rule similar to the class of physical appropriation cases.
The fragmented decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island exemplified the
divide on the Court between those who preferred the application of rules
favoring property interests and those who stressed the importance of balancing
all relevant interests in deciding a takings case.95 The case emphasized the
notion that Lucas’ categorical rule is to be applied only in extreme
circumstances, affirming that it is “[a] complex of factors including the
regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the
regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the
character of the government action” that should be used for determining
whether a regulation goes “too far” when the “regulation places limitations on
land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use.”96 The
divided Palazzolo Court upheld the ripeness of a landowner’s takings claim,97
allowing the courts to decide the question of whether the owner is deprived of
all economic use of his property when a substantial reduction in value of only
portions of the land occurs.98 Because the contiguous parcel of property
retained at least some economic use and value, the Supreme Court remanded
the claim for further analysis, refusing to characterize the denominator of the
deprivation fraction as solely the slice of the property that was affected by the
government regulation.99 The plurality held that the fact that a landowner took
title to the land after the enactment of a regulation depriving the land of some
Environmental Regulations After Lucas?, 4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 287 (1993); Richard A.
Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1369 (1993).
95. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
96. Id. at 617 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
97. Id. at 632. Aside from determining when a taking has occurred, the Supreme Court has
also been troubled with the ripeness of takings claims, often forcing landowners to exhaust all
potentially effective procedural remedies before bringing a takings claim to court. The Court
attempted to balance protection for landowners’ constitutional rights with the avoidance of
wasting judicial resources by encouraging negotiation in requiring landowners to pursue
variances and submit multiple permit applications to regulatory bodies before their claims
become ripe. See generally Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 623 (2002). See also William M. Hof, Note, Trying
to Halt the Procedural Merry-Go-Round: The Ripeness of Regulatory Takings Claims After
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 833 (2002).
98. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
99. Id. The statute at issue authorized the State of Rhode Island to create the Rhode Island
Coastal Resources Management Council and delegated to the Council the authority to promulgate
regulations restricting the use of coastal lands. Id. at 640-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The Council’s regulations effectively foreclosed the petitioner from filling his
wetlands to develop the property. Id. In this case, the petitioner attempted to assert that, because
he was restricted from development of some of his property, there was a taking. Id. at 616.
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value would not automatically preclude the landowner from prevailing on a
takings claim.100
The Palazzolo case is a significant precursor to Tahoe-Sierra as it outlined
the intellectual struggle between those Justices who want to avoid “sweeping
rule[s]”101 and desire to “restore[] balance to that [takings] inquiry”102 by
realizing that the “outcome instead ‘depends largely on the particular
circumstances’” of each case,103 and those who want to avoid the
“(unspecified) circumstances”104 associated with an indeterminate “pursui[t of]
abstract ‘fairness’”105 by seeking more “mathematically precise variables.”106
In fact, Palazzolo predicted battles to come as Justices Scalia and O’Connor
provided separate concurrences that each advocated fundamentally different
approaches to the takings inquiry.
While the Lucas decision outlined the Court’s uncompromising approach
to the chaotic law of regulatory takings, Palazzolo represented the reluctance
of some to avoid adoption of any hard line method for determining when a
regulation goes “too far.”107 It is at this point in the evolution of takings
jurisprudence that the Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit for
the Tahoe-Sierra case in order to answer the question of whether a regulation
imposing a temporary, though seemingly indefinite, moratorium on
development constituted a per se taking of property.108

100. Id. at 630.
101. Id. at 632 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 635.
103. Id. at 633 (noting the “less than fully determinate” nature of the concepts of “fairness
and justice” that underlie the Takings Clause, and showing disdain for any “set formula” that
determines when “justice and fairness” require that economic injuries caused by regulations be
compensated by the government) (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
104. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 636.
106. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
107. See id. at 633, 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that “[o]ur polestar . . . remains the
principles set forth in Penn Central itself” and that “[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per
se rules in either direction must be resisted.”). See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 326 (2002)
(“‘generally eschew[ing]’ any set formula for determining how far is too far, choosing instead to
engage in ‘essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.’”) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
108. See 533 U.S. 948, 948 (2001). The Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit to
answer the following question: “Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a
temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?” Id.
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III. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING
AGENCY109
In April 2002, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in the TahoeSierra case, more than two decades after the first lawsuit was initiated by
aggrieved landowners against Lake Tahoe’s regional regulatory authority.110
The majority specifically adopted the Penn Central approach that requires a
balancing of multiple factors over the hard and fast per se rules as the
controlling paradigm in the regulatory takings analysis.111 The case also
reinforces the importance of modern land-use planning. The majority upheld
the use of moratoria as a legitimate tool to halt potentially harmful
development while a more permanent and environmentally responsible
strategy could be developed for the region.112 In fact, in an era of cynicism
concerning government regulations limiting land use, Tahoe-Sierra
represented “the first clear-cut victory for the government side in a land use or
environmental takings case before the [nation’s highest] Court in [fifteen]
years.”113
Perhaps the most important outcome of the Tahoe-Sierra decision,
however, is the characterization of property the majority implicitly adopted
that underlies the framework of its analysis of regulatory takings. Ultimately,
the Court defined property for the purposes of the Takings Clause as an idea
that includes all aspects of the term and recognized its importance in the
concept of ordered liberty.114 The Court required that in applying the
regulatory takings analysis, the property must be considered together, and
109. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
110. The first opinion in the case history of Tahoe-Sierra was published almost two decades
before the final decision was reached by the Supreme Court. See 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev.
1985). In fact, the petitioners filed suit approximately two months after the adoption of the 1984
regional plan for the Basin, and their complaints gave rise to protracted litigation that produced
four opinions by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and several published District Court
opinions. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 313, 313 n.6. But the tale of this litigation continues.
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir.
2002).
For an analysis of the “Long and Winding Legal Road,” see J. David Breemer,
Temporary Insanity: The Long Tale of Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council and its Quiet Ending in
the United States Supreme Court, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 8-12, 54-55 (2002) (noting as
“disconcerting” the “procedural quagmire” that allowed for barriers to relief, and also noting the
missed opportunity by both the Court and the landowners to expand upon the Penn Central
analysis). Breemer, sympathetic to the claims of the landowners, concludes that the “regulatory
actions have destroyed the dreams of real people, whose lives encompass a small, but . . .
meaningful, slice of the temporal whole.” Id. at 55.
111. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.
112. See id. at 341-42.
113. John D. Echeverria, A Turning of the Tide: The Tahoe-Sierra Regulatory Takings
Decision, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11235 (2002).
114. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302.
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sticks in the bundle should not be severed from the whole property interest.
Though the decision has drawn much criticism, it may yet prove to be the best
outcome. In the end, the Court left room for modification, recognizing that in
the exchange between power and liberty, the meaning of property for purposes
of the Fifth Amendment transforms as the balance between liberty and
authority requires in order to reflect fairness and justice.115
A.

Lake Tahoe: “A Noble Sheet of Blue Water”116

Lake Tahoe is an ancient body of water some twenty-five million years old
and is situated more than 6000 feet above sea level on the border of California
and Nevada.117 Lake Tahoe’s exceptional clarity, because of the lack of
nitrogen and phosphorous in the water, has created a rare natural beauty.118 In
fact, only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality to this
high Sierran lake, but Lake Tahoe is the only one that is “so readily accessible
from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development.”119
Rapid population growth and land use around Lake Tahoe in the 1950s and
1960s led to increased development that would ultimately begin to stress the

115. See id. at 342.
116. TWAIN, supra note 33, at 169, cited in Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230-31 (D.
Nev. 1999). Recounting his travels from a small Missouri town on the Mississippi River to the
American West, Twain, upon reaching Lake Tahoe, observed:
[A]t last the lake burst upon us—a noble sheet of blue water lifted six thousand three
hundred feet above the level of the sea, and walled in by a rim of snow-clad mountain
peaks that towered aloft a full three thousand feet higher still! It was a vast oval . . . . As it
lay there with the shadows of the mountains brilliantly photographed upon its still surface
I thought it must surely be the fairest picture the whole earth affords.
TWAIN, supra note 33, at 169.
117. See Geography & History Overview, Lake Tahoe Data Clearinghouse, Western
Geographic Science Center, at http://tahoe.usgs.gov/geography.html (last modified January 16,
2003) [hereinafter Geography and History Overview]; see also Herber, supra note 27, at 913-14.
It has been explained that:
The Lake Tahoe Basin was formed by geologic block faulting about 2 to 3 million years
ago. The down-dropping of the Basin and the uplifting of the adjacent mountains resulted
in a dramatic topographic relief in the region. The mountain peaks rise to more than
10,000 ft (3,048 m) above sea level, and the surface of Lake Tahoe has an average
elevation of about 6,225 ft (1,897 m).”
Geography and History Overview, supra. For further information on the attributes of and history
surrounding Lake Tahoe, see GEORGE WHARTON JAMES, THE LAKE OF THE SKY: LAKE TAHOE
IN THE HIGH SIERRAS OF CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA (1928).
118. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307. The lack of chemicals that nourish the growth of algae
makes the lake oligotrophic. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
119. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 n.2 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969)). Only
Crater Lake in nearby southwest Oregon and Lake Baikal in Russia are of similar oligotrophic
quality. Id.
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lake environment.120 Though development is often associated with progress,
eventually the lake’s clarity and beauty would be compromised because the
upsurge in development, as in most urbanized regions, caused an increase in
what is known as “impervious coverage” of the land.121 Impervious coverage
(which includes such common aspects of development like asphalt, concrete,
buildings, and even packed dirt) prevents precipitation from being absorbed by
the soil and subsequently creates large amounts of flowing water that can have
more erosive force than individual raindrops scattered over a dispersed area.122
The intensified runoff because of the earnest development of the Lake Tahoe
Basin began to cause increased nutrient loading of the lake and its pristine
condition began to deteriorate rapidly.123 The District Court noted that “unless
the process is stopped, the lake will lose its clarity and trademark blue
color . . . [and] [e]stimates are that, should the lake turn green, it could take
over 700 years for it to return to its natural state, if that were ever possible at
all.”124
The Lake Tahoe Basin occupies five hundred and one square miles and
was shared by five counties, several municipalities, and the Forest Service of
the Federal Government until the two state legislatures, subject to
congressional approval, adopted the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in
1969 (the Compact). The Compact created the Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (TRPA), appointing it “to coordinate and regulate development in the
Basin and to conserve its natural resources.”125 Because there were numerous
exceptions that did not significantly limit the construction of residential
housing and in effect exacerbated the predicament, the two states eventually
adopted an extensive amendment to the Compact in 1980.126 The TRPA was

120. Id. “During the last half-century, increased human activity in the lake basin has caused
the lake’s clarity to decrease at a rate of about 1 foot per year (30 cm/yr).” Geography and
History Overview, supra note 117.
121. Herber, supra note 27, at 914; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308.
122. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308.
123. Id.
124. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226-31 (D. Nev. 1999).
125. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309 (quoting Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 394 (1979)). See also Pub. L. No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969).
This is the original Tahoe Regional Compact of 1969, a regional consortium of multiple
jurisdictions formed to handle the severity of the problems caused because of the increase in
growth in the area after World War II. It was considered a failure throughout the 1970s as the
lake’s clarity continued to decline and the rate of development, particularly the creation of
subdivisions, continued to intensify. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309.
126. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980). See also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309-10.
The TRPA is an example of the emerging intergovernmental approach to land use planning and
other region-wide problems. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (highlighting
emerging models of regional planning agencies created to confront widespread problems on a
broader scale).
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directed in the early 1980s to adopt a comprehensive regional plan that would
achieve and maintain environmental threshold carrying capacities for sensitive
lands throughout the multiple jurisdictions in which the Lake Tahoe Basin sits
where development has caused the greatest harm to the surrounding
environment.127
The 1980 amendments to the Compact, in an attempt to control the effects
of irresponsible development, provided “that in order to make effective the
regional plan as revised by [TRPA], it is necessary to halt temporarily works of
development in the region which might otherwise absorb the entire capability
of the region for further development or direct it out of harmony with the
ultimate plan.”128 The TRPA, realizing that the enormous task it was presented
with could not be completed by the deadlines required in the Compact, enacted
the infamous Ordinance 81-5, imposing the first moratoria on development that
would be challenged in court.129 The Ordinance prohibited the placement of
impervious coverage within certain “land capability districts” that the TRPA
had defined as “Stream Environmental Zones” (SEZs). These SEZs were areas
already naturally prone to runoff and where conservation efforts had focused
on controlling growth in order to curb the likelihood of erosion in those
areas.130
The interim moratoria on development was to remain in effect until the
adoption of the more permanent “ultimate plan” that was required by the
Compact to achieve and maintain those carrying capacities within the
region.131 The Compact assigned the TRPA the complex task of defining the
“environmental thresholds carrying capacities” of lands in the Basin within
eighteen months. Within one year after the adoption of these standards, the
TRPA was to adopt a new regional plan.132 Having failed to adopt a regional
plan within the time specified by the Compact, the TRPA approved another
resolution in the late summer of 1983 that “completely suspended all project
reviews and approvals” and would remain in effect until a new regional plan

127. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309.
128. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. at 3243. The 1980 Compact declared: “The waters of Lake
Tahoe and other resources of the region are threatened with deterioration or degeneration, which
endangers the natural beauty and economic productivity of the region.” Pub. L. No. 96-551, art. I
§ (a)(1), 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
129. This is the first of two moratoria implemented in the region, and it became effective on
August 21, 1981. Upon failing to define “environmental threshold carrying capacities” (because
of a division of opinion within TRPA’s governing board and other political differences) for more
than one year, by the terms of the Compact between the states, the TRPA was given one more
year to adopt a new regional plan. See Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. at 3240.
130. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 308.
131. Id. at 310.
132. Id.
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was adopted.133 The new regional plan was finally approved in April 1984, but
on that same day, the State of California was granted an injunction enjoining
the regional plan from being implemented on the ground that it “failed to
establish land-use controls sufficiently stringent to protect the Basin.”134 This
injunction remained effective until a revised plan was adopted in 1987.135
Thus, many landowners were prohibited from developing on their property for
six years.136
B.

The Majority Approves the Moratoria

The Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra was asked by the petitioners to
evaluate the question of “[w]hether the Court of Appeals properly determined
that a temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking
of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United
States Constitution.”137 In Tahoe-Sierra, the majority refused to apply the
Lucas per se rule to the developmental moratorium.138 The Court noted that
the categorical exception to the “parcel as a whole rule” adopted in Lucas is
reserved for “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or
economically beneficial use of land is permitted.”139 A solid majority declared
that the answer to whether the Takings Clause requires compensation when
government enacts a temporary, though perhaps indefinite, regulation denying
property owners all viable economic use of real property is to be decided by
applying and balancing the multiple factors announced in Penn Central, not by
133. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 311. Because a new regional plan would not be adopted until
April 26, 1984, Resolution 83-21 was a seemingly indefinite moratorium. It ended up being an
additional eight-month suspension prohibiting development on high hazard lands in the Basin,
thus resulting in a moratorium that lasted for thirty-two months. See id. at 311-12.
134. Id. at 312 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236).
135. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1236 (D. Nev. 1999).
136. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338 n.34. Arguably, the TRPA was responsible for only the
first thirty-two months of the prohibition on development, as it was the authority that issued the
moratoria. The majority in Tahoe-Sierra accepts this argument and disregards the final three
years that allowed no development, noting that it was the District Court that issued the 1984
injunction and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that upheld its validity. See id. at 346
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
137. 533 U.S. 948 (2001) (granting certiorari to the Supreme Court). The Supreme Court
explained that throughout the earlier protracted litigation and decisions, the “temporary
moratorium” referred to only two things: Ordinance 81-5 and Resolution 83-21. See TahoeSierra, 535 U.S. at 313 n.8.
138. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330. The Lucas rule states that any government action that
renders property valueless—regardless of its fundamental character, but taking into account such
amorphous common law concepts as the “background principles of [state property law]” and
general principles of nuisance—is a taking under the Fifth Amendment. Lucas v. S. C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
139. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017); see also Cane Tenn.,
Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 105 (2002).
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applying any uncompromising, categorical rule.140 So although the Court’s
physical takings jurisprudence involves the straightforward application of per
se rules, the Tahoe-Sierra holding confirms that the regulatory takings analysis
is to be characterized by “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”141 that are
designed to allow a “careful examination and weighing of all the relevant
circumstances.”142
As part of the rationale for the decision, Justice Stevens’s majority opinion
noted that “[a] rule [requiring] compensation for every delay in the use of
property would render routine government processes prohibitively expensive
or encourage hasty decisionmaking.”143 This view suggests a swing in the
pendulum moving the Court’s jurisprudence away from the view of an absolute
right to use one’s property towards the recognition that such use is necessarily
limited to some extent. It also recognizes that a plot of land is not an island, a
notion that is essential to any proper definition of property. With sufficient
time, the land use planning process “may be permitted to run its full and
natural course with widespread citizen input and involvement, public debate,
and full consideration of all issues and points of view.”144 The Court’s holding
indicates that a proper analysis of whether a regulation effects a taking should
involve a balancing between the interests of the property owner that are
affected and the nature of the government action, rather than focusing solely on
the economic effects of the regulation. Declining to adopt the proposed per se
rule for temporary regulatory takings, the Court noted that it did not “hold that
the temporary nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a
taking; [it] simply recognize[d] that it should not be given exclusive
significance one way or the other.”145 Consequently, when a regulation does
not deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land, the
courts should perform a “more fact specific inquiry” to determine whether a
140. The majority stated:
[T]he answer to the abstract question whether a temporary moratorium effects a taking is
neither ‘yes, always’ nor ‘no, never;’ the answer depends upon the particular
circumstances of the case. Resisting ‘[t]he temptation to adopt what amount to per se
rules in either direction,’ . . . we conclude that the circumstances in this case are best
analyzed within the Penn Central framework.
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 321 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
141. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
142. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 636 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
143. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 335. See also Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922) (noting that “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law”).
144. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 338 n.33 (citations omitted). The Court in Tahoe-Sierra also
noted that throughout the planning process for developing a workable strategy to save Lake
Tahoe from environmental degradation, the landowners and TRPC had ample opportunity to be
heard and in fact were heard either in person or in writing at every hearing. Id. at 340 n.35.
145. Id. at 337.
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regulatory taking has occurred.146 When done properly, such an analysis
should include a Penn Central inquiry into all relevant circumstances of a
particular case.147
Tahoe-Sierra is a clear victory for land-use planning advocates, signaling
an unambiguous shift against the property rights ideology and the Lucas
decision that represented its zenith. But although the Court affirms the use of
the Penn Central factors as a guide to the takings inquiry, an opportunity was
noticeably missed to break-down the intricate regulatory takings analysis and
make such an examination more fully determinate.148 For example, a factor
analysis is the approach endorsed by the current Court, but the majority failed
to state which, if any, of the factors is dispositive or even carries the most
weight.149 In failing to develop the balancing test, observers are free to
speculate as to the reasons behind the majority’s omission. Without any
clarification on this matter, the Court might inadvertently encourage litigation
because planners and property owners, not to mention lower court judges and
attorneys, will be unable to accurately predict the manner in which the
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries will be made.150

146. Id. at 332.
147. Id. at 334.
148. See Echeverria, supra note 113, at 11245 (observing that the Tahoe-Sierra decision
placed a new emphasis on the multi-factor framework, but it provides little guidance on what the
Penn Central test actually is or how it would be applied).
149. See Berst v. Snohomish County, 57 P.3d 273, 279-80 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (under the
authority of Tahoe-Sierra and Penn Central, though the landowners made a claim that regulations
interfered with their investment-backed expectations and caused them to suffer detrimental
economic impact, the court refused to adopt the “novel analyses” that the “imposition of a
moratorium in the absence of due process rights constitutes an unconstitutional taking”).
150. See Joel R. Burcat & Julia M. Glencer, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency: Is There a There There?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11212, 11217, 11220
(2002). The authors stated, “Tahoe-Sierra serves only to reinforce that it will still be some time
before a regulated person can determine when a regulation has . . . ‘gone too far’ and effected a
taking of private property. If anything, the Court’s emphasis in Tahoe-Sierra on the case-by-case
evaluation to be made under Penn Central leaves the fate of takings claims more uncertain than
ever.” Id. at 11220 (citations omitted). The article notes also that the Penn Central “test itself is
far from ‘familiar’” and “defies predictability” because “no in-depth analysis of Penn Central’s
component parts has ever accompanied these recitations.” Id. at 11217 (citations omitted). See
also Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States, 53 Fed. Cl. 504, 520 n.47 (2002) (not explicitly
discussing the Penn Central factors in finding no taking because of a belief that “the facts and
circumstances as a whole prove there was no taking,” and basing its failure to do so on an indepth analysis on Tahoe-Sierra). On the other hand, the notion that property interests are
severable and subject to takings will arguably produce much more litigation.
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C. The Doomsday Dissent: “In the Long Run, We are all Dead”151
The three justices who dissented fundamentally differed from the majority
because they refused to adopt the “parcel as a whole” conception of property.
Additionally, they would have found that the regulations effected a taking
because a temporal slice of the owners property interests was taken when the
moratoria was in place.152 Noting that petitioners were prohibited from
building any structures on their land for “over half a decade,” the dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist reflected his belief that the moratorium on
development required the payment of compensation because it “deprive[d the
land] owners of all economically viable use of their land,” thus falling within
the established categorical rule.153 In his view, the moratorium lasted too long,
and under the prior precedent established in Lucas and First English, the
temporary development restrictions could not be considered a legitimate
“traditional land-use planning device.”154 Also, the regulations could not
properly be associated with the “short-term delays attendant to zoning and
permit regimes [that] are a longstanding feature of state property law and part
of a landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations.”155
The dissent acknowledged the nuisance exception to Lucas’s categorical
rule and the realization that “since the beginning of our regulatory takings
jurisprudence, we have recognized that property rights ‘are enjoyed under an

151. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, MONETARY REFORM 88 (1924)). See also PIPES, supra note 31, at 250-51 (calling
increased environmental protection the result of a Cold War-like “doomsday scenario” and
observing that “[e]nvironmental hysteria . . . provides a powerful emotional rationale for
encroachments on property rights” that “must be sacrificed for the sake of survival of life on
earth.”) The same emotional rationale might be seen in the ardor of the property rights
movement, which has experienced an increased popularity based seemingly on the absurd notion
that environmental quality must be unavoidably sacrificed for the sake of the absolute free use of
land in the name of economic progress or “liberty.” The movement appeals to emotion by
perpetuating the idea that supporting even moderate government protection of the environment
could cause the downfall of America.
152. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 343-44 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 343.
154. Id. But see Roberts, supra note 84, at 11037 (arguing that land use moratoria are an
integral and rational part of land-use planning and permitting, “[p]roperly conducted planning
activities take time” and “rational planning often requires a temporary restraint on land uses” such
that the “mere fact of a delay cannot on its face be found to be a taking without eliminating the
entire permitting process”).
155. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In fact,
the dissent noted that “California, where much of the land . . . is located, provides that a
moratorium ‘shall be of no further force and effect 45 days from its date of adoption,’ and caps
extension of the moratorium so that the total duration cannot exceed two years.” Id. at 353
(citations omitted). Arguably, however, the state gave up much of its authority over the land in
the Basin when it entered into the congressionally approved Tahoe Regional Planning Compact.
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implied limitation.’”156 As such, regulatory takings are not found “in the case
of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances, and the like.”157 Arguably, the moratoria imposed by the Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency were but changes in the existing zoning ordinances,
or perhaps a temporary freeze on development that could even be an implied
limitation of property ownership.158 Nevertheless, the question remains as to
how long the government can restrict development before it becomes a taking.
The Chief Justice argued:
[A] moratorium prohibiting all economic use . . . is not one of the
longstanding, implied limitations of state property law. Moratoria are
“‘interim’ controls on the use of . . . land development in an area by either
‘freezing’ existing land uses or by allowing the issuance of building permits for
only certain land uses that would not be inconsistent with a contemplated
zoning plan or zoning change.159

Besides taking issue with the length of the moratorium,160 the dissent
criticized the majority’s refusal to apply the categorical rule of Lucas on the

156. Id. at 351 (quoting Penn. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413).
157. Id. at 351-52.
158. Id. “A property owner cannot reasonably rely on an assumption that zoning will forever
remain the same, and that the government will refrain indefinitely from valid changes in zoning to
enhance the public interest (including interim periods of cessation in development in order to
prepare for such changes.)” W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d
141, 155 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). Accord Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027
(1992) (stating a “property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted,
from time to time, by various measures newly enacted . . . in legitimate exercise of [the] police
powers.”) (emphasis added). See also Avenal v. United States, 100 F.3d 933, 937 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (noting property owners “cannot . . . insist on a guarantee of non-interference by
government when they well knew or should have known that, in response to widely-shared public
concerns, . . . government actions were being planned and executed that would directly affect
their new economic investments”).
159. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 352 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Rehnquist
noted that traditional moratoria “prohibit only certain categories of development . . . [and] do not
implicate Lucas [because] they do not deprive landowners of all economically beneficial use of
their land.” Id. (emphasis added).
160. See id. at 343-44. The Chief Justice believed that the Court should not have limited
itself to determining only whether the thirty-two month moratorium on development brought
about by the TRPA was a taking of property, but rather, the Court should have inquired more
generally into the nature of the harm and whether the respondent TRPA caused the harm. The
majority inexplicably dismissed this possibility, arguing that the 1984 injunction, issued by the
District Court, was the cause of further delay after the TRPA’s adoption of the regional plan.
This followed a lengthy freeze on development and was adjudged “reasonable” in the majority’s
opinion. The majority noted that the plan allowed for the development of single family
residences. The Chief Justice observed, however, that the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency was
the “moving force” behind the injury because the injunction enjoining the 1984 plan was only
authorized because the plan itself, approved by the TRPA, “did not comply with the
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ground that the deprivation was “temporary.”161 Because the TRPA in effect
denied landowners of all economically viable use of their land, the dissent
believed that where “the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good,
that is, to leave property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.”162 In
fact, Rehnquist characterized the regulations imposing the temporary ban on all
economic use as a forced leasehold.163 He was also worried about creating an
“incentive for government to simply label any prohibition on development
‘temporary’ or to fix a set number of years,”164 no matter how long a
moratorium lasts in reality, in order to avoid the just compensation
requirement. The dissent argued strongly for the application of the categorical
rule and would have opted not to differentiate between physical appropriation
and regulations that deny all productive use of land, no matter however
brief.165
Justice Thomas, in a separate dissent joined by Justice Scalia, argued the
alleged fact that the property would “logically . . . recover [its] value as soon as
the [moratorium was] lifted” must have been a very small consolation to one
who had purchased land with reasonable expectations of development and who
environmental requirements of [the Agency’s] regulations” and thus violated the Compact for
which the TRPA was directed to act! See id. at 345-46.
161. Id. at 347. The Chief Justice pointed out, “[U]nder the Court’s decision today, the
takings question turns entirely on the initial label given a regulation, a label that is often without
much meaning.” Id.
162. Id. at 346 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019) (emphasis in original). The dissent noted
that the District Court found it to be a fact that the petitioners were forced to leave their land
economically idle, and neither the Court of Appeals nor the Supreme Court disputed that the
landowners could not develop during this period. Id. at 346. In Lucas, Justice Scalia noted:
We think, in short, that there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that
when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. Though the categorical rule of Lucas is still good law and there are very
good reasons for the rule, this statement by Justice Scalia appears to be overruled in part by the
holding in Tahoe-Sierra because there was no categorical rule applied where “the owner of real
property [was] called upon to . . . leave his property economically idle” for a time. Id. The
wisdom of this implication will no doubt continue to be disputed.
163. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 347. The district court found that a taking occurred because no permanent date was
set for the end of the moratorium, and thus, its length was indefinite. See id. at 316-17.
165. Id. at 349-50. The Chief Justice observed:
In “the extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of
land is permitted,” it is less likely that “the legislature is simply ‘adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life’ . . . in a manner that secures an ‘average reciprocity of
advantage’ to everyone concerned” . . . and more likely that the property “is being pressed
into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm.”
Id. (citations omitted).
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had been unable to develop for six years.166 Instead of applying a loose factor
analysis where a landowner has admittedly been deprived of all productive
uses of property, the dissent desired to formulate a hard and fast rule for
regulatory takings that would characterize property merely as any interest in
the bundle of sticks.167 Noting that calculating the composition of the
denominator in the deprivation fraction is a difficult and uncertain question,
Justice Thomas took the position that “First English put to rest the notion that
the ‘relevant denominator’ [could be] land’s infinite life,”168 and would
measure the regulated property right against the same property interest,
therefore appearing to find a taking when any stick in the bundle of property
rights is removed. He believed that a regulation effecting a total deprivation of
a temporal slice of a property right should be a taking under the Fifth
Amendment “regardless of whether the property so burdened retains [some]
theoretical useful life and value if . . . the ‘temporary’ moratorium is lifted.”169
It appears that applying the rigid Lucas rule under these circumstances,
where the deprivation of property is by its terms temporary, would effectively
deny the fact that the Lucas opinion itself emphasized at least “eighteen times
that there is no categorical tak[ing] unless all value and use has been
permanently deprived.”170 The dissenting justices focus only a small, albeit
valuable, temporal portion of the property owners’ interest in their land to find
a taking. Looking to the archaic way they characterize property rights, this
result was inevitable. The dissenting justices look only toward what the land
owners have lost instead of looking at the bigger picture and balancing the
interests of all involved. By adhering to a strict bundle of sticks notion of
property, the dissent fails to acknowledge that bundles of property rights must
166. Id. at 356 (citations omitted). But see Echeverria, supra note 113, at 11237 (“evidence
showed that owners in the basin typically held their property for 25 years before seeking
development approval”).
167. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 356 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas ended his
discussion with the statement that “in the long run, we are all dead.” Id. (citing KEYNES, supra
note 151). He noted that “individuals and families were deprived of the opportunity to build
single-family homes as permanent, retirement, or vacation residences on land upon which such
construction was authorized when purchased.” Id. However, such an analysis, while refusing to
look to the long term economic value of the property, also fails to take account of the Court’s
holding in Palazzolo, namely that a landowner taking title to land after the enactment of a
regulation depriving his land of economic value is not automatically deprived from bringing a
takings claim. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001). The holding in TahoeSierra appears to be the converse—just because development was authorized when a landowner
took title does not automatically preclude the regulatory body from exercising its authority to
limit the land use without being subject to a takings claim.
168. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 355 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 356.
170. FREILICH, supra note 28, at 61. See also Paul Barta, It’s About Time: The United States
Supreme Court Correctly Rejects Temporal Severance in Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 36 CREIGHTON L. REV. 479 (2003).
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emanate from a thing.171 Thus, the definition of property through which they
approach the regulatory takings analysis is incomplete.
D. The Parcel As A Whole
The “parcel as a whole” theory is the opposite of the conceptual severance
approach, for it does not allow landowners to segment their property interests
in such a way so that the loss of one interest could be viewed as a total taking
requiring compensation. As commonly defined, the term “property” means
“[p]ossessions considered as a group.”172 Looking at the property rights or
interests of landowners in the aggregate, the Supreme Court in Tahoe-Sierra
adopted the theory of property articulated in Penn Central.173 There, the Court
refused to limit its definition of the relevant property for the purpose of the
Fifth Amendment takings analysis solely to the regulated interest and rejected
dividing a single parcel into discrete segments.174 The lingering effect of Penn
Central combined with the rationale of the Tahoe-Sierra majority is that the
Court should view all of the property interest as the denominator in the socalled takings equation, rather than characterizing only the regulated interest of
the property as the guidepost against which to measure the amount of the
property interest that has allegedly been taken.175
The Tahoe-Sierra opinion noted that in Andrus v. Allard and Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, the Supreme Court affirmed that
“where an owner possesses a full ‘bundle’ of property rights, the destruction of
one ‘strand’ of the bundle is not a taking.”176 The majority declared that “[a]n
interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that describe its
geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal

171. See Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a Community-Based
Resource, 32 ENVTL L. 733, 789 (2002) (noting that the “single-minded” metaphor of the bundle
of sticks “amounts to a new kind of absolutist monolith that is seriously out of touch with
alterations that have occurred and continue to occur in the law”). Duncan observes that “the
conception of ownership embodied in the bundle metaphor cannot be squared with contemporary
knowledge and values.” Id. at 783.
172. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1097 (3d ed. 2000). The dictionary
also defines real property as something owned, tangible or intangible, to which the owner has
legal title. Id.
173. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 334.
174. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978).
175. See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
see also Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331 (stating that “the starting point for the [District] court’s
analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of the entire parcel; if not, then
Penn Central was the proper framework”).
176. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 327. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979)
(holding that “the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking”);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 480 (1987).
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aspect . . . .”177 By viewing property interests in the aggregate, the Supreme
Court attempted, perhaps unintentionally, to integrate the traditional preHohfeldian conception of property as a distinctive right in a thing that is good
against the world back into the working definition of property.
The approach to the denominator problem taken by the majority in TahoeSierra was necessary to make whole an idea of property that is “good against
the world” and that could be balanced against the police power of the state.
The perspective of the parcel as a whole allows the Court to weigh the
regulated property interests against the property interests retained by the owner
in determining if a taking has occurred. “[W]e need the parcel-as-a-whole rule
to preserve the essential character of balancing: the fact that balancing looks to
more than one factor. Value alone should not predominate.”178 Viewing the
parcel as a whole does not allow the property owner to divide the interests into
discrete segments, whether they be horizontal (parceling the geographic metes
and bounds of the land), vertical (dividing property rights into air rights or
mineral rights, unless by statutory authorization), or temporal (separating
interests according to present or future fragments of the term of years
contained in the claim of right to the property in the first place). To the extent
that the categorical rule expressed in Lucas requires that the landowner be
deprived of all economically viable use of a property interest, the parcel as a
whole doctrine precludes the use of only one aspect of the bundle of property
rights when measuring it against the prohibitions or limitations set upon the
property by regulation.
IV. THE ENDGAME: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE
Imagine two potential developers possessing title to real property in the
Lake Tahoe Basin. Each prospective developer is given a choice. One can
build a lavish home with no limitation in respect to the land area used, the
capacity of infrastructure needed, or the amount of resources damaged as a
result of building. On the other hand, a landowner could choose to build a
more humble abode that consumes less space and causes little, if any, damage
to the surrounding environment. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis, the
economically rational outcome is that both “prisoners” would refuse to
“cooperate” and would not choose to develop modestly but would instead build
the most luxurious structure they could afford. This attitude generates
resource-intensive development built over large amounts of land because each
homeowner stands to gain more, both financially and in other aspects like
177. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331-32 (emphasis added).
178. Wright & Laughner, supra note 72, at 11188 (arguing that the “distinction [is] clear”
between a temporary moratorium and its analogy by Chief Justice Rehnquist to a leasehold,
which is a temporal interest in land, such that “[a]bsent physical invasion, all dimensions of the
property must be viewed in their entirety”).
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personal luxury, than the other choice presented.179 If both landowners
cooperated with each other and engaged in responsible development, neither
would realize a lavish dream house, although both may experience moderate
gains.180 However, if one landowner builds a small home in a more
environmentally sensitive manner while the neighbor opts to build a mansion
or develop in a way that substantially escalates the amount of impervious
coverage, the latter may be said to win by acquiring the goodwill of the former
who sacrifices in order to preserve the lake by developing in a more
environmentally accountable manner.181
This dilemma exemplifies the predicament faced in the Lake Tahoe Basin
and in other development hotspots around the country. The reality is that in an
era of mushrooming land development, especially during economic boom
times, to maximize the intake of capital, each man is locked into a system that
compels him to increase his land use without limit—in a world that is by its

179. See Susan Hallatt, The Smart Growth Debate: A Prisoner’s Dilemma—Who Wins and
Who Loses After Selfish Development Decisions are Tallied?, Planetizen: The Planning &
Development Network, at http://www.planetizen.com/oped/item.php?id=71 (Nov. 4, 2002)
(concluding that “the Prisoner’s Dilemma illustrates unequivocally the benefits of cooperation
over ‘selfishness’”).
Under the Prisoner’s Dilemma analysis, this situation is termed the zero-sum result with
no benefit because each economic individual’s gain, though not insignificant, will be offset by the
other developer’s failure to cooperate. The Prisoner’s Dilemma “captures the net benefit of
choice.” Id. The typical example involves a situation where a crime was committed and there are
no witnesses. If two suspects, or prisoners, separated and interrogated, choose to cooperate with
each other by not confessing, they will both benefit by obtaining lighter sentences. If one
cooperates but the other does not and tells on the other in exchange for a plea, the latter wins and
the cooperator gets hit with the stiffer penalty. In our example, the cooperator is the modest,
responsible homebuilder who loses because the other gains much more financially because of his
disregard of the consequences of his actions, not to mention he has a bigger house. If both
prisoners confess, each gets a medium sentence and no one wins. The logic of this brief article
seems to imply by analogy that if both developers seek their own short-term interest and refuse to
cooperate, such environmentally taxing development might have the effect of sending both to
“jail” because over time, their selfish actions will produce a benefit for no one. A zero-sum result
will occur. The prison in this metaphor is a completely short-term, market-driven basis for action
as opposed to the benefits to property value that could be realized from long-term planning and
ecologically conscious development. For a better explanation of the case of the prisoner’s
dilemma, see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 269 n.9 (1971).
180. Each homeowner, for example, could still have a home in the Lake Tahoe Basin and
would also help ensure the region maintains the environmental quality that attracted people to the
area in the first place.
181. Not just homeowners, however, cause the problem. “Development activities such as ski
areas and golf courses have contributed greatly to the nutrient loading of the lake.” E. Clement
Shute, Jr., Interim Development Controls & Moratoria Under the Ninth Circuit Decision in
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING, & EMINENT DOMAIN at § 15.02 (2001).
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nature limited.182 There is seemingly no incentive, fiscal or otherwise, for one
to develop in a manner that is not resource-intensive, especially when the
burdens associated with development are not likely borne by the developer, but
rather are shifted to the public resource in such a way that is not immediately
noticeable. Thus the question remains as to how the scales of justice may
properly be balanced to ensure that the government, while managing the spread
of humankind’s urban footprint, refrains from going “too far” in regulating
private land use.
What is needed in this land use puzzle is a rule that protects the integrity of
private property, the foundation upon which our nation was founded, as
opposed to policy that merely seeks to protect potential economic injuries. A
democratic process, with adequate checks to ensure there is no tyranny of the
majority,183 could perhaps provide for adequate safeguards for planners and
landowners alike. Epstein has rightly observed that the moratorium caused
landowners with undeveloped land to bear the burdens caused by those who
already had developed.184 It is clearly “inequitable to bestow a benefit upon
some people” while taking rights from others, so to balance the effects of such
regulation, a possible solution could be to evaluate the extent to which the
regulation enhanced the economic value of the developed parcels of land
(especially those whose impervious coverage contributed to the problem in the
first place) and redistribute the benefits they received across the universe of
landowners who have borne the costs of the regulation that effected a “taking”
of their property.185 Such a situation could properly balance the scales of
justice—the government could prepare a plan to confront the regional problem,
taking some time to develop an effective solution, the adversely affected
landowners may take comfort in the fact that the costs they bear will be
redistributed, and the owners of currently developed land would give back any
182. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968)
(observing that the economically rational herdsman will conclude that in the short term the
sensible course is to add more animals to his herd grazing on common land, thus each herdsman
seeks to maximize his profit without regard to the devastating effects that over-consumption of
resources will have on the common land in the long run and that each herdsman pursues his own
interests by acting in ways that realize an immediate utility to each at the expense of the whole
commons).
183. NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 18 (noting that to the founders, the propertied class must
necessarily be the minority and that the property-less majority would have no direct interest in
protecting the rights of private property). Perhaps government has its most legitimate role out of
the necessity for the protection of land and its capacity to protect the interests of another
minority—the environmentally conscious—against the seeming majority of private property
owners.
184. Richard A. Epstein, Taking By Slivers: Ruling Shows How Factional Politics can
Survive Despite Constitutional Efforts to Limit Government Abuse by Protecting Property Rights,
169 N.J. L.J., July 29, 2002, at S-9.
185. See Bell & Parchmovsky, supra note 47, at 554.
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windfall they received while not being held responsible for any problem their
previously developed land might have caused.
A. The Citizen’s Responsibility: Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas186
Justice Holmes’s statement in Pennsylvania Coal regarding the reciprocity
of advantage of a regulation reminds us that property ownership exists in a
society.187 Society by its nature is built upon a system of laws as opposed to
the war of all against all, or what Eighteenth Century philosophers called the
state of nature.188 Thus, our rights, even to property, must be subject to certain
inherent limitations in exchange for the guarantee that these rights exist. But
does this idea of an intrinsic constraint conflict with traditional American
ideals?189
While there is a strong argument for individual liberty and the absolute
right to use one’s property, such use must necessarily be limited to some
extent. Almost one hundred years ago, “new conceptions of the relations of
property to human welfare” were recognized, maintaining “that every man
holds his property subject to the general right of the community to regulate its
use to whatever degree the public welfare may require.”190 The more
significant question though, is to what extent the use of land can be limited.
The use of one’s property, however beneficial to the individual or to the
society at large that recognizes the importance on personal freedom, cannot be
allowed to injure the rights of other citizens in their respective properties or in

186. “So use your own as not to injure another’s property.”
187. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 341 (noting that “with a moratorium there is a clear
‘reciprocity of advantage’ because it protects the interests of all affected landowners against
immediate construction that might be inconsistent with the provisions of the plan that is
ultimately adopted”).
188. See Charles K. Rowley, State of Nature and Civil Society, in THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 514, 516-17 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (clarifying
and commenting about the supposed dichotomy between the state of nature and civil society).
Later in the passage, the author expands upon the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes and
explains the “war of all against all.” Id. at 517-18.
189. See NEDELSKY, supra note 19, at 65-95 (discussing the philosophies of Pennsylvania’s
Gouverneur Morris concerning the market economy). See also Paul Turner & Sam Kalen,
Takings and Beyond: Implications for Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25 (1998).
190. BETHELL, supra note 29, at 175 (quoting Theodore Roosevelt). In 1910, Theodore
Roosevelt stated:
We are face to face with new conceptions of the relations of property to human welfare,
chiefly because certain advocates of the rights of property as against the rights of men
have been pushing their claims too far. The man who wrongly holds that every human
right is secondary to his profit must now give way to the advocate of human welfare, who
rightly maintains that every man holds his property subject to the general right of the
community to regulate its use to whatever degree the public welfare may require.
Id. at 174-75.
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the rights of the public in commonly held pieces of property.191 We must
avoid the temptation to define property and property rights as merely
functional means to the end of wealth maximization or strictly economic gain,
or even as existing solely because of their innate utility to the greater good of
free enterprise. Property serves a more important role in the American
story.192 For it is in the labor that man exerts that creates that connection
between a human being and his or her parcel of land that was believed to
inculcate virtue and foster the development of republican ideals.193 It was once
not only in its marketability that property had value. Thus, the land should not
be viewed as simply an asset. Property is more than the alienability of a parcel
of land; it is a collective mass of rights that brings liberty and social
responsibility. It is dangerous to view the property interests the Constitution
was created to protect as purely economic. As Justice Holmes observed, the
“Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez
faire.”194
The rational economic person in today’s world likely cares more about the
rights in property owned individually than with the long-term effects that some
of his activities might have on a nearby public resource.195 The nature of our
economic system seems to take for granted any part of the natural world that is

191. See David S. Wilgus, Comment, The Nature of Nuisance: Judicial Environmental Ethics
and Landowner Stewardship in the Age of Ecology, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 99, 102 (2001). The
author presents a thoughtful comment on our age, noting:
[T]raditional notions of property law must contend with new scientific discoveries about
our environment . . . [and] . . . [c]onsistent with our new understanding of the
environment, courts should adjust modern property law to include a condition of
stewardship within the common law notions of what it means to be a property owner in
the twenty-first century.
Id. at 100-02. See also Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within
Nature’s Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927 (2000) (advocating for a reconciliation of property
rights and ecological consciousness that focuses less on individual freedom and more on the
environmental effects of property use).
192. Justice Philip A. Talmadge, The Myth of Property Absolutism and Modern Government:
The Interaction of Police Power and Property Rights, 75 WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2000) (noting
that “[p]roperty rights are, of course, important in the American view of ordered liberty”).
193. See MCCOY, supra note 5, at 65.
194. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
195. However, while he may never actually “use” the lake, the landowner who develops on
lakefront property certainly benefits from its existence, and, in the case of Lake Tahoe, its
uniqueness. But to the extent that his property will not lose value in the reasonably foreseeable
future, for example, if the lake’s clarity is not significantly diminished until sometime late in the
Twenty-first Century or even later, what economic incentive does the landowner have to care?
Perhaps one solution to the problems in Lake Tahoe would be to privatize the surface of the lake
itself, giving adjacent landowners a concrete legal interest in the property that could support an
action in nuisance or trespass.
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not reducible to economic quantification and fails to recognize the value of
nature’s assets, causing us to seriously underappreciate the ecosystems that
provide vital services.196 Richard Epstein has observed that a “primary goal of
a system of property is to provide islands of independence that allow all
individuals to pursue their own projects without interference from others.”197
While it is true that individuals may pursue their ends without interference
from others to a certain extent, when is it that an island in pursuance of these
projects has gone “too far”? A proper theory of property will be able to answer
this question. Epstein also adds that the difficult part is to ensure that “rights
created in the long run are worth more than the correlative duties that are
necessarily imposed.”198 From this perspective, how can the duty to forestall
development for some period of time—three months or three years—be
considered a taking when one realizes that, in the long run, the property rights
protected will undoubtedly be “worth more” than the imposed duty to postpone
development or to develop one’s property in an environmentally sensitive
manner?199
In Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Epstein
represents the model property rights advocate who wants the court to adopt the
conceptual severance theory, with the view that all takings of any part of an
196. Katherine Ellison & Gretchen C. Daily, Natural Assets, NATURE CONSERVANCY, Fall
2002, at 88. “We don’t watch Earth’s assets in the same way we dog our investments.” Id. The
authors of this essay argue for the pressing need for a full accounting of nature’s services and a
realization that engineered substitutes can be more costly than preserving earthly assets in the first
place. Id.
For example, the cost to preserve Lake Tahoe by treating it with massive amounts of
chemicals while continuing to allow erosion and damage to the chemical balance of the lake
caused by the impervious coverage of development could be enormous in terms of money, not to
mention the unknown adverse environmental impact of the chemicals. From that perspective, a
delay in further development might not seem such a bad idea. In fact, after an assessment is done
by a scientific authority, then, with proper citizen and government participation, it may even be
concluded that it would be more cost effective to continue the rate of development while curing
the lake through alternative remedial strategies.
197. Richard A. Epstein, Property as a Fundamental Civil Right, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187,
190 (1992).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. This is true especially considering the fact that most people hold property in the Lake
Tahoe basin for an average of twenty-five years before they begin to develop, a fact that may
allow one to argue that even a six-year waiting period is not excessive. Those who do not
properly look to the “long run” are effectively trying to beat the system. Those landowners that
rushed to development before the enactment of use restrictions in a heavily regulated “industry”
were trying to place burdens disproportionately on the public so that they could realize economic
gain.
To make certain that rights created are worth more than the duties imposed should
perhaps lead us to create more rules for developmental moratoria. A system that limits moratoria
to certain circumstances and precise time limitations might properly balance the interests of all
involved and reflect the ideals embodied in the Constitutional structure.
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individual’s property interest require compensation from the state.200 His
proposed notion of the proper relationship between the individual and the state
argues that requiring compensation for every regulation that diminishes
property value would properly balance the “monopoly of force [by the
sovereign] and . . . the preservation of liberty and property.”201 Though
seeming to echo the framers’ intent, this statement reflects a Lochner–era
distrust in the power of the sovereign that has become an essential element of
the property rights movement.202 Attempting to strike the appropriate balance
between individual landowners and regulatory authority, Epstein believes the
exclusion from the use of one’s own property is a taking regardless of how
long it lasts.203 In fact, Epstein disagreed with Justice Stevens who, in writing
for the majority in Tahoe-Sierra, seemed to assume that the test for whether
property is taken is directed more toward what the owner retains than what he
has lost.204 However, as it is true that justice is intimately related to the idea of
property,205 a fair and just inquiry into the takings question must necessarily
focus on both what the regulation takes away from the property owner as well
as what rights the property owner retains.
B.

The Planner’s Responsibility

In 1980, Justice Brennan inquired into an apparent double standard in the
law when he noted that “[a]fter all, a policeman must know the Constitution,
then why not a planner?”206 The Tahoe-Sierra decision, while a victory for
land-use planning, squarely places upon the planners the duty to stay within the
Constitution—within the parameters of developed takings law and to carefully
consider the Fifth Amendment when forming land-use regulations and using
planning tools like moratoria. The Tahoe-Sierra decision seems to give
planning officials faced with significant growth pressures some breathing room
to more thoroughly consider how best to manage the modifications to their
community’s land use. The sharp criticism from the dissent and some of the
200. EPSTEIN, supra note 4, at 15.
201. Id.
202. See generally Herber, supra note 27. See also Talmadge, supra note 192, at 858 (noting
that “[t]he ideologically driven views of the modern-day property-rights advocates, however,
would effectively undercut the police power by elevating policy disputes to constitutional
dimensions, thereby transferring the decision-making process from the people acting through
their elected representatives to the courts”).
203. Epstein, supra note 184, at S-11.
204. Id. Epstein inferred that such a conception of property might inspire the government to
“take” property piece by piece. Id.
205. Tom Bethell, Introduction: Property and Justice, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Winter
1990, at 1 (noting “without private property there can be no justice” and “an important reason for
studying law . . . should be to inquire into the relationship between property and justice”).
206. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nation’s most preeminent legal scholars, as well the majority’s emphasis on
“considerations of fairness and justice,” however, should give planners a note
of caution to take the utmost care when formulating a planning regime. TahoeSierra reinforces the notion that delay is an inevitable part of the land-use
planning and regulatory process, perhaps even one of the normal incidents to
property ownership.207 But moratoria should only be used as a last resort.
Local, state, or regional government planners run the risk that the
upholding of temporary development moratoria will become nothing more than
a temporary victory for the land-use planning movement. For a government
entity to avoid liability, an allegedly taken property right must first inhere in
the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the state’s law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.208 Justice Stevens’s
review of “fairness and justice” concerns in his analysis indicates that the
options for governments to regulate land use are expanding. Planners still have
a very serious responsibility to review the regulatory decision-making
processes and to ensure that land-use regulations not only foster previously
articulated goals but also permit individual landowners to use their property in
some reasonable economic manner during the adoption of land use guidelines.
The majority in Tahoe-Sierra did make it clear, though, that the planners’ task
to protect and represent the public in fostering strategic growth while also
refraining from interfering with individual property rights plays such an
essential role in society that a hard and fast categorical rule cannot encompass
all of the intricacies associated with such a fundamental responsibility.209
Thus, public policy is best served by approaching the regulatory takings
question with a set of standards (albeit a set that is as of yet undeveloped)
based upon the foundation of considerations of fairness and justice.
The land-use planning process can effectively serve those goals by
adhering to its self-imposed guidelines. Allowing for public involvement in
the development of regional growth strategies might also be desirable, though
it is not without its own flaws. Professor Epstein has observed “the unjustified
loss” in which he notes that the actual rolling moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra had
the “intended consequence” of shutting out outsiders indefinitely from the land

207. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) (noting that reasonable landowners must expect those “normal delays in
obtaining building permits, changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like”).
208. See Esplanade Properties, L.L.C. v. City of Seattle, 307 F.3d 978, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the lawmaker accused of the taking cannot be liable if the interests allegedly taken
were not part of the original title in accordance with background principles of the property law of
the jurisdiction) (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029 (1992)). See also Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027
(noting a state may resist paying compensation only if the “logically antecedent inquiry into the
nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to
begin with”).
209. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 323-25.
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use decision-making process. He argued that honoring the Fifth Amendment
requirement would force the “planning agency to reconsider its hands-off
attitude to the current uses that initially created the land-use problem.”210
Epstein points out a flaw in Justice Stevens’s economic analysis that assumes
that the behavior of planners and of incumbent homeowners would remain the
same even if the compensation requirement was imposed.211 He has identified
a real problem in land-use planning with focusing restrictions and regulations
solely on future development instead of attempting to address the pre-existing
land uses that may be short of actionable nuisance but that have caused the
problems and created the need for the intense regulation to remedy the
situation.212 Owners of already developed property might have been involved
in the political process, but they surely had a motive to encourage the TRPA to
preclude further residential development on undeveloped land. However, if
the use of vast amounts of impervious coverage in development is the culprit
causing the Lake Tahoe crisis, absent any specific legislative authorization, a
common law nuisance action, or any violation of a background principal of
state property law, it would be difficult to find any legal remedy for the
government or the public to protect Lake Tahoe from property owners who
develop their property without considering whether such development would
be good for the Lake. Instead of the all-or-nothing approach, the challenge is
to find a just balance of power and liberty.213
C. Property: The Guardian of Every Other Right214
“Because property rights are no longer significant protections against
[seemingly] arbitrary state power, those on both the political left and right have
made efforts to rethink what property is and what role it should play in our
society.”215 It is apparent that clear lines cannot be drawn. Only a balancing
of expectations can internalize a more fluid concept of property. But the
210. Epstein, supra note 184, at S-11. But see Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 393,
417-18 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (stating that “the purpose of a restriction does not cease
to be public, because incidentally some private persons may thereby receive gratuitously valuable
special benefits”).
211. Epstein, supra note 184.
212. See generally Robert Innes, Takings, Compensation, an Equal Treatment for Owners of
Developed and Undeveloped Property, 40 J. L. & ECON. 403 (1997).
213. PETER W. SALSICH JR. & TIMOTHY TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS & PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF LAND USE LAW 116 (2d ed. 2003) (noting the
“importance of establishing policies before regulations are enacted”).
214. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 26 (1998). “The right of property . . . is the guardian of every
other right, and to deprive a people of this, is in fact to deprive them of their liberty.” Id. (quoting
ARTHUR LEE, AN APPEAL TO THE JUSTICE AND INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN,
IN THE PRESENT DISPUTE WITH AMERICA 14 (1775)).
215. SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 127.
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question remains as to how the law should properly balance the interests of
liberty and property in a modern democratic society.
In commenting upon the general structure of the takings problem, Bruce
Ackerman has identified the following essential question: “[I]s it fair to say
that the state has taken one of [the property owner’s] things away from
The petitioners in Tahoe-Sierra included the Tahoe-Sierra
him?”216
Preservation Council—a nonprofit membership corporation representing
approximately two thousand owners of both improved and unimproved parcels
of real estate in the Lake Tahoe Basin—as well as a class of some four hundred
individual owners of vacant lots located on lands where conservation efforts
focused on restricting development around the lake.217 The “wellspring of
their undoing” lies in the fact that they asked the Court to apply a categorical
rule whenever a temporary moratoria or other regulation denies all
economically viable use of land for any period of time. In terms familiar to the
regulatory takings analysis, the landowners perhaps went “too far.” The Court
of Appeals in Tahoe-Sierra explicitly refused the temptation to apply the hard
and fast Lucas rule to the category of temporary restrictions imposed on
development. Agreeing, the Supreme Court asserted that the multiple
standards of Penn Central are “the appropriate framework for analysis.”218
The costs of litigating would impose serious burdens both upon the
individual property owner and on the judicial system itself if each landowner
was forced to bring his case individually, especially when compared to a broad
rule that might be applied categorically.219 Also, the district court held that the
moratoria did not violate the Penn Central balancing test, but rather was a
categorical taking under Lucas,220 even though the Ninth Circuit reversed and
found there to be no taking whatsoever.221 Although individual landowners
generally might have a better chance of prevailing under the multi-factor test
and ad hoc judicial inquiries by bringing as-applied challenges to regulations,
substantial procedural barriers tend to push objectors toward facial challenges
216. ACKERMAN, supra note 35, at 101. While this is the role of the courts, the “Policymaker
is obliged to determine the best way in which the costs involved in moving to a better world are
to be distributed among the citizenry . . . .” Id. at 30. Ackerman also presents a discussion of a
more complex question—should the property owner be left bearing the entire loss associated with
the legal change or should this loss be spread among his fellow citizens? See id. at 29-40.
217. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 312.
218. Id. at 319.
219. This concern for cost and the preservation of judicial resources does not seem to be of
any specific importance to the majority. If it was, the cost to society and environmental
protection of applying a broad categorical taking rule to temporary restrictions on development
must have outweighed this concern.
220. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1242 (D. Nev. 1999).
221. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 782
(9th Cir. 2000). The court noted that the plaintiffs did not even “argue that [the moratoria was] a
taking under the ad hoc balancing approach described in Penn Central.” Id. at 773.
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instead.222 The petitioners seemed to appeal only the ruling that there was no
categorical taking, and their failure to specifically disapprove of the lower
courts’ finding that there was no taking under the Penn Central framework
served as part of the rationale used by the majority to completely avoid
applying the Penn Central factor analysis it approved in Tahoe-Sierra.223
The effect of the Tahoe-Sierra decision will remain to be seen as lower
courts flesh out the majority’s affirmation that the “essentially ad hoc”
approach to the takings inquiry is the appropriate method of analysis.224 The
majority in Tahoe-Sierra admitted that considerations of “fairness and justice”
must play a more central role in the takings analysis and that they could even
arguably support the conclusion that TRPA’s moratoria constituted takings of
property.225 Fairness and justice might suggest that the individual claim of
right should be protected to the utmost extent as the foundation upon which the
American system is built. But while land-use planning becomes more

222. See SALSICH & TRYNIECKI, supra note 213, at 114-17 (noting the practical
considerations of dealing with moratoria that both landowners and planners must bear in mind
and that contribute to the development of regulatory takings doctrine). Whether or not
landowners do have a better chance of prevailing under the Penn Central test is debatable,
however, landowners certainly “‘face an uphill battle’ that is made especially steep by [a] desire
for a categorical rule.” Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 320 (2002) (citations omitted).
223. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948
(2001) (granting certiorari to the Ninth Circuit). The “[p]etition for writ of certiorari is granted
limited to the following question: ‘Whether the Court of Appeals properly determined that a
temporary moratorium on land development does not constitute a taking of property requiring
compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution?’” Id. The Chief
Justice disagreed, however, noting that the certiorari granted was not limited to any of the
“petition’s specific questions,” and he would have instead characterized the question as the
broader one of whether or not a taking was effected by the temporary moratorium. Compare
Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 307 n.1, with Transcript of Oral Argument Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 2002 WL 43288, *11 (Jan. 7, 2002) (revealing that Mr.
Berger, on behalf of petitioners, in response to questioning from the Justices stated, “We did not
present a Penn Central case, that’s correct.”)
224. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Cambridge City Council, 779 N.E.2d 141, 154
(Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (“[T]he considerations defined in this fashion invite idiosyncratic decision
making”); Machipongo Land & Coal Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Pa., 799 A.2d 751, 765, 768
(Pa. 2002) (“This fairness and justice standard, although amorphous, necessarily guides our
analysis . . . .” State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 775 N.E.2d 493, 495-97 (Ohio
2002) (reconsidering the case under the Penn Central test and still finding a taking). See also
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216 (2003) (5-4 decision) (finding a
technical taking of private property but not requiring compensation because the Court focused on
what the property owners lost and not what the government gained). For a review of TahoeSierra and commentary on its role in the regulatory takings context, see TAKING SIDES ON
TAKINGS ISSUE: THE IMPACT OF TAHOE-SIERRA (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003); Benson R.
Cohen, Tahoe-Sierra, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Moratorium, 30
ECOLOGY L. Q. 741 (2003).
225. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S at 304.
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important in modern society, the desire for a practical arrangement and a
conception of property that will work efficiently, and promote fairness and
justice, must be the desired end of the Court. Only a fact-sensitive balancing
test can achieve such a result.
Of course, notions of fairness advise that there ought to be certain limits to
the moratorium power, lest government power be exercised so arbitrarily or
exist completely beyond the reach of public involvement. More precise limits
will help avoid what Chief Justice Rehnquist noted as the “incentive for
government to simply label any prohibition on development ‘temporary,’ or to
fix a set number of years” to a regulation, no matter how long, in order to
allow it pass Constitutional muster.226 In the end, however, only by balancing
the individual’s rights to property and liberty with the society’s legitimate
interests in protecting the general welfare can the Court produce a just
outcome.227 Hard and fast rules are the equivalent of drawing judicial lines in
the sand—they will eventually wash away with the ebb of the tide of new
factual circumstances and evolving American jurisprudence and conceptions of
property.
V. CONCLUSION
The framework of the American social contract protects individual private
property rights from actual and constructive appropriation by government
entities or other citizens, but the judicial approval of zoning and other land-use
regulations for many years has favored the police power to restrict land use to
a greater extent. In approximately the past twenty years, property rights
advocates have reacted against the restriction of liberty by taking a strong
stand against regulation. Though the conservative minority led by the Chief
Justice lost the battle over Lake Tahoe and the proposed expansion of Lucas’s
categorical Takings rule, the war for property is not over.228 It is now clear
that the Takings inquiry depends on more than just the way in which the
denominator of some “mythical fraction” is characterized.229 The analysis

226. Id. at 347 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
227. The pertinent scrutiny must be that “[i]f individual losses are found to be ‘outweighed
by’ social gains, the measure is deemed legitimate.” Michelman, supra note 13, at 1193. In
1967, Michelman pointed out the dangers and traps of the reliance upon a balancing test. Id. at
1193-96.
228. This holds true especially when one realizes that the most “static” Court in history
(unchanged in composition for a period longer than any other Supreme Court configuration) is
soon due for a change in membership and that Justice Stevens, the author of the majority opinion
in Tahoe-Sierra, is the oldest current member. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of
the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569 (2003). See also
COYLE, supra note 84, at 262 (noting that the “courts are on a journey of discovery, rethinking
the limits of governmental power over the landowner”).
229. See Freilich, supra note 66, at 591.
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turns not only on the property interest which may be affected by the regulation,
but on how one defines the underlying meaning actually given to property as
embodied in the Constitution.230
The new understanding of property must embrace the totality of the
concept—encompassing the theoretical collection of sticks, the more tangible
nature of the physical relation that the lay person associates with it, and an
explicit awareness of its role as the buffer between power and liberty in order
to give a wholeness and integrity to the expression.231 “Without an accurate
understanding of the base [of the pyramid of property rights that is formed by
the security of the rights of property], our conceptions of what happens in the
refined atmosphere of the apex will often be distorted, or at least
incomplete.”232 The problem with the older conception of property is that it is
an unrefined view that denies the essential function of our legal relationships
and interests to things and the numerous property rights we possess that might
be separate and distinct from one another.233 The problem with the strict
bundle of sticks notion, on the other hand, lies in separating rights from the
corpus that substantiates them. Realizing that the bundle is often lost amongst
those sticks is disconcerting because it makes it difficult to collect all the sticks
at once and tie them into a neat package we can label “property” that has a
constitutional meaning. While undoubtedly a person’s rights in property can
lack certain interests for various reasons, the glue that holds the bundle

230. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
231. See Cécile Fabre, Justice, Fairness, and World Ownership, 21 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY
249, 271 (2002) (articulating a new conception of property ownership borrowing some features
from private ownership standardly understood and some from collective ownership, which the
author suggests would more directly satisfy concerns of justice and fairness); Lawrence G. Sager,
Property Rights and the Constitution, in NOMOS XXII: PROPERTY, supra note 35, at 381. “[T]he
link between property rights and the human personality consists of the role of property as a buffer
between the individual and the state. . . . [and] the new property must consist of legally secured
claims against the largesse of the state”). See also Hobhouse, supra note 34, at 397. His essay
concludes:
What we have to aim at would seem to be an analogous relation between the individual
and the community, adapted to the complexity of modern conditions, combining the
security of the old regime with the flexibility and freedom of the new, . . . [a]nd for these
purposes we have to restore to society a direct ownership of some things, but an eminent
ownership of all things material to the production of wealth, securing “property for use”
to the individual, and retaining “property for power” for the democratic state.
Id.
232. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 398 (2001).
233. See generally JOHN CHRISTMAN, THE MYTH OF PROPERTY (1994). The author states his
intention from the outset: “‘[P]roperty’ in its traditional sense, which I call the liberal conception
of ownership, is truly a myth that ought to be exposed and abandoned.” Id. at 3. He continues
with a discussion of the evolving concept of ownership. See id. at 15-27.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

752

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:703

together should never go without notice. Only this conception can cultivate the
proper respect, from both individuals and society, for property.234
The Tahoe-Sierra opinion provided an approach to the takings analysis
that offers the potential for cultivating a characterization of property that
balances the interests of government, of society, and of property owners, all
while realizing the legal system’s ultimate goal of furthering “fairness and
justice.” The opinion, however, leaves much room for debate, and the question
remains open as to the exact method to structure an analysis of an inverse
condemnation claim. Perhaps the Court could have articulated a form of
rational basis approach or an acknowledgment of substantive due process
rights concerning deprivation of property.235 The Court clearly missed an
opportunity to create a set formula to determine the boundaries of regulatory
takings law. The Court could have set limits on the length of time before
moratoria effect a taking. The Court could also have developed a more
creative test adopting a rebuttable presumption of a taking when certain factors
are met, thus shifting the burden to the regulatory authority to prove the
constitutionality of its actions. Only time will tell if Tahoe-Sierra is an
anomaly or just the first step towards the development of a more coherent and
reasoned approach to the question of regulatory takings. But perhaps there is
some reason for the vagueness of this doctrine.236
On its face, it appears the Court’s takings jurisprudence does not concern
itself with finding some exact definition of property or with addressing any of
the other metaphysical inquiries of academic circles. The Supreme Court in
the end is not the appropriate location for such nebulous examinations, just as
the courts are not the proper place for deciding the environmental threshold
carrying capacities of an oligotrophic lake basin. Rather, the Court is a forum
for the resolution of concrete disputes affecting true adversaries. If we look
beneath the surface and delve into the muddy waters of takings law, we can
understand why the Court must focus on these fact-intensive disputes if it
234. In his influential work, Thomas Grey noted:
The capitalist process, by substituting a mere parcel of shares for the walls of and the
machines in a factory, takes the life out of the idea of property. It loosens the grip that
once was so strong—the grip in the sense of the legal right and the actual ability to do as
one pleases with one’s own.
Grey, supra note 35, at 78 n.30 (citation omitted). To promote at least some sense of
environmental stewardship, a modern concept of property should not completely conceive of land
as nothing but a thing to be exploited.
235. See generally SCHULTZ, supra note 22, at 183-98. See also Henry A. Span, Public
Choice Theory and the Political Utility of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 107-08 (2003)
(arguing that property “owners’ recourse should be equal protection review” where a moratorium
that is not a pretext for permanent prohibition has been enacted).
236. See Mark R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
93 (1996) (commenting on the “vagueness in takings doctrine [that] may well reflect a deeply
ingrained societal disagreement about the nature of private property and the role of government”).
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hopes to make good law. The definition of property the Court adopts
understands it as a negotiated term, its meaning bargained for in some middle
ground between the inviolability of property rights and the power of
governments to regulate land use. By understanding that the functional role of
private property is by its nature flexible, the Tahoe-Sierra majority implied an
operational definition that reflects the role of property in the economy and
applied this notion to maintain an appropriate margin between power and
liberty under the circumstances before the bench. In the end, the Court’s
decision might reflect a reaffirmation of the jurisprudence discrediting the due
process protection of purely economic rights that was established during the
Lochner era.237
In avoiding a categorical rule, the Supreme Court in effect has said to the
planners and property owners of America that the Constitution does not
embody a definite thing-oriented or bundle-of-sticks theory of property.
Instead, the Court, for better or worse, is agnostic as to any absolute meaning
of property, approving what amounts to a negotiated concept of the term and
only giving guidelines to the parties in order to encourage compromise.238 The
Supreme Court adopted the multi-factor analysis approach that can account for
the nuances of each case and provide a mechanism to ensure a result
embodying notions of fairness and justice. Such an approach recognizes that it
is in the interaction between often competing characterizations of property that
this evolving idea is continually defined and its role woven into the fabric of
American society. Only in this way can the Court protect the interests of
individuals, majoritarian factions, and government regulators from the abuses
of others.
Justice Holmes seemed to contend in 1922 that the police power and
eminent domain exist on opposite ends of the spectrum of government
authority, and that a line can be drawn somewhere in between in order for
courts to clearly recognize the difference between a regulation and a taking.

237. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“Liberty under the
Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due
process”).
238. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302, 334-36 (2002) (admitting “the concepts of ‘fairness and
justice’ that underlie the Takings Clause” are less than fully determinate). See also Erin Ryan,
Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning
Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 337 (2002). For a further description of the way the “meaning
of property [evolves] concurrently with changes in community values,” see Duncan, supra note 5,
at 1095. See also Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 93 (2002). Perhaps this is the Court’s way of staying out of this complicated debate, leaving
it to ordinary citizens to define the parameters of our system. As Learned Hand noted: “For
myself, it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians . . . .” LEARNED
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1960).
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But the difference is one of degree and not of kind.239 The line in the sand
representing when government regulation goes “too far” will continue to shift
with the changing political tides, but it will always remain the divide between
liberty and the demands of organized society—protecting each one from the
excesses of the other. Therefore, land-use planners should use their time more
efficiently and wisely when imposing development moratoria to control the
effects of untamed urban growth before the takings pendulum inevitably
swings back in the other direction and a more robust, meaning for the notion of
property emerges. On the other hand, property owners cannot reasonably
expect absolute land use rights and must yield to the incidents of property
ownership in a society as well as the checks and balances that majoritarian
power places upon libertarian principles when government, from time to time,
adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life.
Though not flawless, the majority decision in Tahoe-Sierra provides an
approach to achieving the proper balance of the interests of government and
the interests of property owners in the regulatory takings analysis. It is thus
somewhere in the organic nature of the Constitution that exists the precise
definition of property as a function of this balancing between the excesses of
power and liberty. Until the law recognizes a rule where both the interests of
liberty and power can be incorporated into the meaning of property, a
balancing test is the only way to ensure that all property is “duly respected.”
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